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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
An explanation and oriticism ot John Locke's theory ot pro-
perty, a8 he himselt presents it 1n the Segon4 T£eatise ~ elyil 
Government, ls the principal aim 01' this theais. Chapter Pive 01' 
the Treatis" "On Property," is thererore tne basic source tram 
whiah the matter ot the thesis is drawn.1 Other parts 01' Locke's 
political theory presented in tne ~eat',e, e.g., the state 01' na-
ture, the nature, origin, and 1im1ts 01' civil government, are sec-
onduJ to the • tudJ 01' Locke t s theory 01' property. Because of' the 
limited nature 01' this paper, on11 a brier discusslon 01' Locke'. 
predeoeasors in the tield 01' property theory is included in this 
work.2 Similarl, only those implioations which immediatel, 1'01-
low trom the logic ot Looke's own theoP,y are considered. Ho at-
tempt 18 made to trace e~aboratel, the consequences 01' Locket. 
propertr tneorT on subsequent economic theorJ.3 
1 John Locke, !!! Basal concernin1l: the True Oridnal, Extent,. 
and .4 .2t ~lVl1 Ggvll'!!P!fUt {Second TJtea1l1~O itVll lJgvernm,n1?). 
ch. S":""an roperty. in '50 Treattfe. 01' iv 1 gvS!~nt, BvePl-
man 84. (W,. York, 1943),-PP. 1~9- 1."". "I All 8uaequent ret-
erence. to the Second Treatise ,,111 be designated by ~ 
2 Se. this ohapter, pp. 8.10; ch. II, pp. 32-33, 38-39. 
38e• this Chapter, PP. 11-13 tor a bri.t treatment 01' Locke'. 
intluenoe on subsequent economic theorists. 
1 
2 
Thus the th.sis is divided into tour chapters. The second 
and thlrd chapters are the core ot the thesi8, inasmuch a8 they 
present Locke'S tneory ot property as he Intended it to operate 
firat in the atate at nature, and then in civil society. Chapter 
Two ls there tore concerned wIth propert,J in the ltate ot nature; 
Ohapter Three, wlth clvil property_ To the explanation ot the 
various points ot Locket. doctrine in Ohapters Two and Three, is 
joined a prel1m1nary critiCism, lometimes favorable, more otten 
expre •• ing partial agreement and partial disagree.ent. In Chapter 
Pour, a mOre camplete and unified ana17sis and criticis. is pre-
sented, and an attempt 1s made to understand wbJ Locke neglected a 
complete Itudy of civil property, particularly of the 80cial obli-
gation. ot civil property. Certain obvious ll.ltations in Locke's 
theory are in tni. way better understood. 
Looke, how.ver, was primarill a poll tical, not an economio, 
philo8opher. In hi. own wordl, the Second !reatiae 1s "An Blsay 
concerning the 'rue Origlnal, Extent, and End at Clv11 Govern-
ment."4 AI foundation tor this the0rT ot civ!l government, Locke 
also develops a theory of societ1, or ot the nature ot man al a 
1001a1 being. The theor7 ot property, therefore, is subordinated 
to theae otner two oonald.ratiana, the nature ot man .s a aocial 
4 ~, ah. 1, seot. 1, p. I1S. 
.3 
and as a polltlcal belng.~ Accord1ng17 they a180 must be given 
some attention In the followlng chapters. !he tirst part of Chap-
ter Two is ~ererore concerned with a description ot man in the 
state ot nature, .a a locial but not a pollt1cal being. The tirst 
part ot Chapter Three describes man as a member ot political soci-
et7. The state ot nature 11 the setting or environment for the 
origin ot propertlJ civil .ociety, the environment for ita frui-
tion. 
In the J:lemainde,. ot this introclucto17 chapter, the lignifi-
cance ot Locket. property theory 1s evaluated from .everal points 
ot vi... Plrst the importanoe ot Chapter Pi ve (" On Propert,.") to 
the re.t ot the Second TreaH,.' i. discuased. '.rhen oertain oon-
tempor&l7 vi ... on pJ'lOpert,. in Lockean Bngland are considered in 
order to estlmate the intelleotual atmosphere in whlch Locket. 
doctrine on property made ita initIal appearance. Finall,.. same 
Indioation 18 given ot tine intluenoe which his property theory ex-
erted on later Brltish economlats, especially Adam SBdth. All 
the.e obaervatlons, however, are brierly made 81noe they are In-
tended merely .. s an introduction to the treatment of the theo17 
itselt in Chapters Two and Three. 
SRlchard McKeon comments: "The tundamental terms which lie, 
trequently unexamined, behind the consideration ot propert, and 
determine it. detinltlon, are terma descriptlve ot the nature ot 
man and the nature ot his group organlaations."--Richard McKeon, 
"The Development ot the Concept of Property in Political Phl10so-
phy," Bthica, XLVIII (Apri1c1938), 302. 
"Propertf" In the Second lreat!" 1. sometlmes Interpreted 
broadly, a. inoludlng "llfe, liberty, and estate.,,6 On the other 
hand, 1t often signifie. simply the posses8ion ot materlal good •• 7 
Furthermore, Locke aay. that every man has a "property" 1n his 
own peraon and in hls own labor, a. the work ot his,h&nda.8 Hence 
the term propertl admits ot many interpretations in Locke's Second 
Treatise. The basic meaning ot propertl tor Locke, whieb give. 
sub. tanc. to all the other.s, is that ot prgpr1wa, a La tin word 
meaning one " .2S, trom whioh the English word proR!rtl is de-
rlved.9 Hence und.r the notlon ot property &s being what Is onet. 
own, Looke inolude. all the natural r1ght. ot man. "But h. 
(Locke) included 1n the general name 'property' every man'. tllte, 
l1berty, and .ata'.,' that 1., tiDe whole ot his natural rignta .a 
60,0 •• ch. 7, sect. 87, pp. 1$8.1$91 "Man ••• hath by na-
ture a power not onl7 to pre •• rve hi. propertr-.that 1., hl. 11te, 
11bertr,and eatate again.t the Injurie., etc •••• " Se. also 
ch. 9, •• ot. 12), PP. 179-180, "[A]nd it 1. not without reason 
that he {:man In, the atate ot naturel •• ek. out and 18 willing to jo1n in society with others who have alread7 united, or have a 
mind to unite tor tbe mutual pre.ervation ot their liv.s, liber-
tiea, and e •• at •• , whioh I call b.J the general name--property." 
1 Ibid .. ch. S •• ect. 31, p.l)2, "But the chler matter of 
propertj being now not the r.ru1t8 of the earth and the beaata that 
sub8ist on It, but the earth It.elt, aa that eto •••• " 
8 Ibid., seot, 26, p. 130. 
9.ebater's Hew Collegiate Dictionarl, based on W,bater'a New 
Internationa! b&CiIonarl, 2nd ea. (!prlngtleld, Mas •• , r9~6), ---
p. 677. 
5 
a human being, and not simply bis land and goods."lO 
This identification of property with all natural rl~pts in-
troduced contuaion into Locke's statements on property, but, In 
tne opin10n ot most cr1tics, 1t added greatly to the importance of 
his theory just1fying the natural right of property. For tne jus-
titlcation ot property as a natural right then involved the Justi-
t1cation of tn. entire syat.m ot natural r1ghts. Specitically, 
it, as Locke intended, the right to property 1n material goods be-
longaa to man independently of clvil sooiety, then the other natu-
ral rights, aubsumed under the term property, belong to him in the 
same waJ. Again, It government ex1sts to proteot th.e natural 
r1ght ot prop.r~, it also exists to proteot the other natural 
right., and oannot intertere with their proper exeztoi.e. Protes-
I 
SOl' George H. Sabine comment •• 
Thi. account ot property, though introduced almost casu-
ally, had a protound ettect on Locke'. whole soolal phi-
loaophy. a. never aald, and almost certainly dld not be-
l1eva, that there was no natural right except P»OPerty. 
frequently, however, he used "property" where he ..... 
to have meant any right, and aince p"party was the only 
natuztal right whioh he examined at length, lt .s inev-
itable that It ahould stand out aa the typical and im-
portant right. In any case, he conceived all natural 
r!f:~:a~bi~o~~sl!~:: :!cr::~e!n~'g~:;n!:n;=l!ay, as 
Aa "property. It therefore, natural ri gh t8 can be regulated only to 
10J. W. Gough, John Lock,', Politic!l fhl1olophY (Oxtord, 
19$0), p. 85. . 
llaeorg. H. Sabin., ~ Bl.to£X ~ l~1t1g11 The0ll, reyi.ed 
ad. (B.w York, 19$0), p. ~2~~ 
6 
the extent that i. neoe •• &r7 to .ake etteotive the equally valid 
ola1ma ot another peNon to the lame rights. 
h_ another poiDt ot vin, Looke'a property theo!?, oontribu-
ted to .. tabli.b government by can •• nt 1n hi. pol1ttoal philolo-
pbf. Men who own property prior to their entering loclety and 
government are e0Ol101110&11,. independent ot their neighbors. Henoe 
not thr'ough sub.enient tear 01' coeroion, but yoluntar117, through 
theil' own oonaent. the,. tOJ.Wlll or join oivil 1001et1 anc.t aurrend.eJl 
aama ot their property by •• , ot taxatlon. In like manner, gov-
e1"lUllent t. ch~.t tuk 1n their e,.e •• ill be to .ecure the canCi1-
tiona neoe •• &r7 tor ~e. aa indivldual. toenja,r aDd lnorea.e 
thel. prope:-t,. 
1'here can be 11 ttle doubt that It 1. Locke ts theol"'1 ot 
property. and the prominent po.ition that it oooupies 1n 
the tOHhont ot hi. polltical 171tem, which baa been 
largely l'e.paa.lble tor the generally held vie. that h. 
was •• aentiallJ and primarily an individua11st. Not 
content, .1 l'UD7 contnok:r1an •• ere, wl1m a politioal 
Uheol"7 whioh ... 4. men exchange their natu.'rtal lIbert, tor 
.eour1t7 and ppoteot1on, Locke, 1t 1. otten pointed out, 
was oaNtul to Wist that propel't)" waa an inatltution 
whioh, ao tar tJtOl'll owi:nB Its existenoe to olvU aoolet" 
had _1.,,84 in the aMt. ot natu~e 1 belt, and. fie p~1Ile 
task ot government w.. to pre •• Pye 1t unhar.ed. 
Taxation la lawtul, but only wi th the con.ent ot the people, 
81noe p~opert7 i. a natupal right.13 
120ougb, PP. 73-74. 
130.6., ch. 11, •• ot. 140, p. 189' "[11']01' It arqone shall 
ola1m a-poiel' to 1&7 and leV7 ~axe. on the people by hl. own au-
thox-iif, anc1 without .uch conaent ot the people, he thereby !n-
vad •• tbe fundamental law ot property, and 8ubverts the end ot 
government." 
7 
Leo Strausa claim. tor the theor7 of property a unique posi-
tion in Looke's political thinking. "Locke's doctrine ot proper-
ty, which i8 almost literally the central part ot his political 
teaching, is certainly Its MOst characteristio part. It diatin-
gulshea his political teaohing most clearly trom that ot Robbes 
and froll the traditional teachings as well."14 Strauss earetully 
points out that this singular position ot the property' theory 
wlthin Locke'. Second ~reatia! i8 not immediately evident trom a 
study ot Chapter V ("On Property"). Locke was obliged to conceal 
"the revolutionar7 character of' his doctrine" on property', because 
in hia age moat people atlll adhered to the older vie. accordlng 
to which the unlimited acqUisition ot wealth is unjust or morally 
wrong. lS !here tore , in stating hia doctrine, Locke had to in-
volve his meaning, and uae the phraseology ot the law ot nature, 
l4L.o Strauss, .!~al Right ~ 81storx (Chicago, Ill., 
1953), p. 234. Strau.~ reasoning behind the above statement i. 
summarIzed thus. Locket. great etfort in the theory ot property' 
was "to prove that the unl.imited, acquisition ot wealth is not un-just or morally wrong." In Locke'. day thia notion ran counter to 
the "bIblical tradition" ot the people that avarioiousness or 
greed is unjust or morally wrong. In addition, his property theo-
rr, by ita emphasis on natural right. over natural dutles, oppoaed 
tne traditlonal teaching. ot Thomaa Booker and Scholasticlsm that 
dutle. firat ot all are derived tram natural law, not rly~ts. 
Plnally. Locke's property theory distlnguishes him tram Hobbes In 
that Locke furthers through the theor.y Ideas originally proposed 
by Hobbe.. Since Locke make. man's acquisltive Insttncts the no~ 
of morality in property, he contirms and considerably advances 
Hobbe.'a position that an ethical system ot natural rights based 
on the Ego should supersede the older system ot natural duties 
baaed on man's tinal end. 
15Ibid., p. 246. See a180 n. 11 above. 
8 
since the baoking of natu~al law would holp to establish his new 
ideas. Yet he did indicate the true oharacter of his doot~lne 
16 clearly enough. St~aussts interpretation of Locko's p~operty 
theo~ will be handled more fully in Chapter J<'our. 17 Here we note 
only the connection of the property t..'leory with the entire Second 
Treatise, as indicated by Strauss. 
Locke's readers, the adherents or the Hevolutionary Settle-
Illent ot 1688, noted sharply the implications of his property the-
ory, slnce property considerations were such an important part of 
their struggle for political ind.ependence. J. W. Gough notes that 
some of the major political disputes during the reigns of the Stu-
art monarchs had concerned fiscal questions, and these disputes 
helped to make the sanctity of private property a political ax10m 
to be defended to the uttermost against the pretensions of the 
royal prerogative. He concludes, "It is only to be expected, 
16 Ibid., pp. 246-247: "He (Locke] traced the introduction of 
'larger possessions and a· right to them' to 'the desire of having 
mo~e than man t needs or to an increase in • covetousness,' or to 
'.imS2J! scgleratul Imbsmd1, evil concupiscence.' In the same vein 
he speaks disparagingly of 'little pieces of yellow metal' and of 
'sparklIng pebbles. t But he soon dr"ps those niaiser1es: the bur-
den of his chapter on property is that covetousness uld concupis-
cence, fa~ frOtn being ossontially evil and foolish are, if pro-
perly channeled, eminently beneficial a.nd reasons h!., much more so 
than 'exemplary cr~rity.t By building society on the 'low but 
solid ground' of selfislmess or of oertain 'private vices,' one 
w111 achieve much greater 'public benefits' than by fut1lely ap-
pealing to Virtue, which is by nature 'unendowed.' One must take 
one's bear1ngs not by how men should 11ve but by how they do 
11 ve." 
17See cb. IV, pp. 88-90. 
9 
tnererore, that a prote.aed apologia for the Revolution of 1688 
ahould give great prominence to the inviolability of private pro-
perty. n18 
Property waa a rallylng-point, a revolutlonary weapon in 
Lockean England. Harrlngton had publlshed his treatla. on the 
economic baals of politics, Oc.ana: "Harrington stood alone among 
the politlcal writer. of his time 1n seeing that government Is de-
t.rmined both 1n its atructure and ita working by underlying so-
cial and economic torces. • • • The underlying thought in Harring-
tOnts theory is that the form ot govern~ent which is permanently 
posaible in a country depends upon the distribution of p~operty, 
.apecially property in land. Whatever class owns a preponder~ting 
'balance' ot the land, say three parts 1n tour, must by sheer eco-
nomic neoeasity command the power to control government. n19 
Prudent men realized that Harrington had oonsidettably ovel.9played 
the economio factor 1n polItical 11te,but the toroe ot h1s ideas 
strongly appealed to the landed and merchant olaasea. Thus Har-
rlngton's dootrine spread far and wlde 1n England before the rea-
toration of the monarohy under Charles II.20 
In oppoaltion to the plutocratic tendenoles ot HarrIngton, 
lS00ugh, PP. 75-76. 
19SabIne, p. 498. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of 
Oce!BI, ed. Hen~ Morle7 (London, 1887)J rirs' publiahed, 1556. 
2OwI11iam A. Dunning, A Hlatoi ot Poll tIcal '!'heories trom 
Luther 12 Monteaquleu (New 'ork, 1 2S1, p. 248. -
10 
va~loua democratic ~.rol'll movement. "'1'8 atoot In England at the 
aame t1me. One such gz-oup weN the LevelleN, who oampaignect tor 
polltloal equality apart tram prlVileRa ba.ed on property. 
Agains' the pr-evaI11ng vi .. that Parl1a\lfmt represented v.sted 
tnteNata, the Levellel" olaimed that, "[I)t 18 the man, not the 
Interest. that 1s subject to the law and hence it 1. the .aD and 
not prop.rtf that mould be Npreaentett.,,21 Another Nt ... group 
were the ft.ue Lovellers 01' the Diggers., BYR'H aoolallsta who 
sought pertect econODdo equa11ty. Unlike the Leveller. who de. 
fended PI'Ope~t1 .a a natur-al right, ~. Dlsge~a claimed common 
OWIl.rahlp ot the land aDd 1 ta pl'oduo ta .a the "natural. a ta te ot 
man. aU 
'l'hua by the pnaaW'1 ot oonnlotlng v1ew. the average aeven. 
teenth cent\U7 &l.gliahavm was toroed. to tora 8ame opinion on the 
nature ot properttJ' and l'a pUrpoae in olvil aociet,. Moreover, 
tn. taot that propertf was widel, distributed In Bngland at that 
t1me. and tbat property ctualltloatlana .el'e l"equil'8d tor IlUtf'ltap 
m4 .I. t2l'tlol1 tOl' lI_ber.hip 1n Parliament_ 11kewlse contributed 
2la.bine, P. 467. Fol' a cOlIPlete treatment ot the Levellere 
aDd. Dlspra lIOVell8llta, of. Sabine, ah. XXIV, "Radicala and C __ • 
ntata" J alao Dunnina. ab. VII, "!beor! •• ot tmePur1tar1. Re'Volu-
tlon.-
22~ p. !t9l • H. ~uot •• Wlnstanle", the ohier apologiat 
tor the-nIii8r81 Bone ought to ba lord. or landlords ovel' anoth-
er, but the earth Is f'ltae for' evaJ!'1 aon an4 daughter to live fit.a 
upon.fI--Gerrard Winatanley. WorM. ad. Sabine (1920), p. 289. 
u 
to make {JOeke t. reader. WtWlWil.ly propG~t,..m1nd.d. 23 
In th.. inslAnd of 1100 and altezt, tb.e h410 SUl'~\\ll.d1ng Looke 
8$ thtt phtlosopb$JI' or the Revolution naade !I.15 political theol'S. •• , 
1nelud~: his th30J7 ot Pr'Opel'ty, pl:'lito'loal11 unasaal1able. AI 
Pa..'chal !~uld.n notes I: t.hls ••• detl''''ntal to tho development t'4 • 
':rue phl1osoplQ' of civil ppoperty,.24 No atte-lUPt _s mad. to ana-
lJ1S8: ex-ltlcal17 a theo~ or civil propen" u~nts on the ba-
$:18 Which LocJcG had proposed, PW8cft8l. labo~. "tn.etead of enqt.dP-
lns wbat; to .. of PftP8n,- weft ••• oo_unl". to pl.\l)llo qUfU"It, 
unpl"otiuable:11aqtd.d.tlona l'f8t"e 1natl'utod with ngal'4 '-0 ttl. ll1 .. 
torioal or!d.n 01' PSJoho1og1oal baal. of p1"1vate. pl'op41rt,. as 
sueh."as 'Ph11oaopb.~s cQ,ncu,PDed t~.l" •• 1 tb. the p~bl •• o~ 
vhei'Jhe.t- til'.' oc,ol.lPl'tlon or o~el.tlv. labor- " ... the hlstoJl'toal ot-l-
sin ot 1"1ghta 1n p~rtJ, ot>nf't.wlns the title bl whloh p.1"opGJ,tt:.J 
was h1a1Jtet'1oallr acq1d.re4 nth the fttioftl.1.. or Pl'et/pen" 1""lt. 
!b»ough tho rust ba1.t of tho eisnte.nth o.n'~. tberef'oN. "the 
sucetlaSOH or Locke did littl. to aodl17 tM rundaantal uhal1ft~ 
tel!t1stl.fl .t btl teaoh1nga wIth "~a~ to tb& natul"e of p~ .... 
'1 •• 26 
If. 4 Q n J£. d A 1-., I •. tu Matt. 
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Yet the true utility of Lockets property theory to later eco-
nomic and po11tical thought was uncovered in the latter half of 
the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries. Locke's oft-
repeated d1ctum that the end of government is the preservation ot 
property had become an axiom of e1ghteenth century political the-
ory.27 This induced the great olassical economist, ~dam Smith, to 
decide that the need tor civil government is proportionate to the 
acquilition ot valuable property, and that the protection of indi-
vidual property is one ot the principal objects of government's 
eXistenoe.28 Lockets emphasis on labor as the origin of property 
rights 1s likewise affirmed by Smith: "The property which everyman 
has in his own labor, as it 1s the original foundation of all 
other property, so it 1s the most sacred and inviolable."29 
Finally the Lockean idea of labor as the source of value is also 
developed by Smith.30 Joseph Senumpeter, the great contemporary 
27Qough, p. 85. n. 1. References in the Second Treatise to 
the preservation of prop.~ty as the end of the state include: 
ch. 1, sect. 31 p. 118; Ch. 9. sect. 124, p. 180; ch. 11, sect. 134, pp. 183-1~4. 
28 Adam 8mi th, An ;mauin iDa JiWl Bature .awl CaUial 2t .!bI. ~~ ~i~l. Bk.~ch. 1. pt. 2: ed. Routledge (London, 
1893) .. p. 556: The acquisi tion of valuable and extensive propet--
ty, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil 
government. Whet-e there i8 no propert1. or at least none that ex-
ceeds the value ot two ot- three dayst labor, civil government is 
not 80 necessary." 
29Ib14" Bk. I, ch. 10, pt. 2, p. 96. 
30Ib1d h r 25 __ ~•• , 0 • #, P. • 
1) 
historian of economic theory summarizes Locke'. contribution to 
economic theorT thus: "He contributed much not only to the theorT 
of money. he also penetrated into the problem of value--from tne 
point of view at the labor theory of value."31 
31Joaeph Schumpeter, ECfi9ili, I2ect~ .i.!l.Q M~thOd An Hlstor-
lcal Sketch1 trans. R. Arlaew or ,). p.6. See a180 J'O'IUi r. set , A Hi.torl or Economic 'lhowmt CNew York, 19$3), 
p. 89. Por an-aocoWlt orLockean influence on nineteenth centUl'Y 
English soolali8m, aee aleo Thomaa I, Cook, '" Introduotion to Twg 
%reatl." ~ gov'rDmlS' by John Locke" (New York, 1947), pp. 
xxx'rl .. xxxv11. 
CHAPTER II 
PROPER!!' Dl !HB S'1'A'l'E OF 1A'l'URB 
Part One - Jfart In the State ot lfatUN 
Look. <t •• or-lb •• the state or natUPe thus. "[AJ state otpe~­
reot tJ:tee4ca (to:r _n] to ordet- their actiona, and dlapose or 
thelt- poa ••• alO1l8 and persons as the7 think tlt, within the 
bounda ot the law or n~ t~. wi thou' .. ak1ng l.a ve 01' depending 
upon the will or any othel' man, A atate al.o of equa11t7, wbe:reln 
all the poweIt and jurisd.iotlon 1. Nclprocal. no one having IRON 
tban aJ'10~ ... ·1 1O..e.eN he de.oribes the .... atate ot nature: 
"Men living together aoooZ'41ng '0 reaaon wl$bout .. oomaon superior 
on .ax-ttl wl th aut:horl t1' to juclge betwec the. i. properl, tn • 
• ta t. ot nature •• 2 
The Lookean atate ot nature Uleref"ore 1. 8001al, though not 
poli tloal. lien live together under tn. unuaual corull tlona ot oom-
ple. tJtee40m an4 pe:rteot flquallt7. both or which e11llf.nate ~e 
poe.lblll., ot political government and regulated political 11te. 
Looke'. view 01" natw.-al IWl tberetON» •• ta h1m ott tp_ the A~l •• 
1 0,0., ob, 2, •• ot, 4, p. 118. 
2Ib'~lj ob, ), a.ot. 19. pp. 126-127. 
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tote11an doctr1ne that the state 18 a natural institution, and man 
naturally a po11tical animal. 3 St. Thomas A~uinas, among many 
others, also upholds the th.eory that man 1s l?z nature a political, 
a8 well as a sooial, being.4 Richard I. Aaron comments: Hi. 
[Locke'a] indiv1dual 1s artificial. He has no family ties. He 
tend. to be conoe1ved a8 a somewhat isolated being even when he 
enters into social relations with others. ft5 !his interpretation 
ot Locke by Aaron is true, but with ~ualifica.tion. 
In his treatment of the state of nature, Locke is laying the 
foundationa for a theory of government limited by the consent of 
the governed. Conae~u.ntly he abstracts trom secondary details to 
concentrate exclusively on the persons in whom this power of con-
.ent to government directly re.ide.: in his d&7, indivIdual adult 
male.. Even when treatIng of property, where family needs are 
3S •• Aristotl., lfAit19" Bk. I, ch. 2: lba Politic' ~ AE1a-
totl" trans. Well don London, 1883), p. 5. See al.o Ar1atotl., 
Ilcomachean Bth1oa, Bk. I, ab. 1. l!l!. BioeMean Ithie., trans. 
lettAon (ton!on, 1908), p. ,. 
4Sanotl T.bomae Aquinatls, In 11c, Ethicorum, Bk. I, Leotio 1, 
n; 4: "Sciendum est aute.. cum homo naturallter est animale aocl-
ale, u~ote qu1 Indlget ad auam vitam multi. quae slb1 ipse solus 
praeparare non poteat, consequena eat, quod homo naturaliter sIt 
paraal1cujua multitudin1a, per ~uam praestetur sibi au:xl1ium ad 
bene vi vendum. ft --Sa,nctl 'fhoma .• Aquina tis, aRnI Omn1a, PAl'Dla edi. tion, Musurgia Publishers (Wew York, 1949), , 2. 
Translation: The fact .that man 18 by nature a soolal animal, in so 
far as he requires for his proper existenoe marq th1ngs whioh b., 
hi. own efforts he cannot provide for h1mself, ilasas a conse-
quence the faot that man 1a des t.ined b7 na ture to form part of a 
oommuni ty which makes a tull and cOI!q)lete l1fe possible f or him. 
5R1chard I. Aaron, i.2!m. Locke, 2nd ad. (Oxford, 1955), p. 284 
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paramount, Locke makes only passing references to the individual's 
6 role as provider for a family. Since it is the male pre-
eminently who labors to gather the fruits of the earth, cultivate 
the land, etc., in him chiefly is placed the great foundation of 
property. Women and children presumably derive their property 
rights from the prototype of the husband and father. Actually, 
Locke conceives of several societies intermediate between the in-
dividual in the state of nature and political society: "The first 
society was between man and wife, which gave beRinning to that be-
tween parents and children, to which, in time, that hetween master 
and servant cnme to be added. And thouph all these mi~ht, and 
commonly did, meet together, and make up but one family, ••• each 
of these, or all together, came short of political society.,,1 
6~, ch. 5, sect. 28, p. 131; sect. 48, p. 140. 
1 Ibid " ch. 1, sect. 11, pp. 154-155. Locke's doctrine here 
is the same as Aristotle's in Bk. I, ch. 2 of the Politics with 
this exception: Aristotle sees the domestio household as essen-
tially incomplete and therefore only intermediate to the perfect 
society, the state. Locke, given the same data, concludes that 
men organize civil society out of personal convenience, not natu-
ral necessity. (C,G., ch. 8, sect, 95, pp. 164-165) Aristotle: 
"In the first place, there must be a union of those who cannot ex-
ist without each other, for example, of male and female •••• And 
there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may 
be preserved. • • • Out of these two relationships between man and 
woman, master Wid slave, the family first arises. But when sever-
al families are united and the assooiation aims at something more 
than the supply of daily needs, then oomes into existence the vil-
lage •••• When several villages are united into a single commu-
nity, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-
sufficing, the state comes into existence, orieinating in the bare 
needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good 
life." (Politics, Bk. I, ch. 2, pp. 2-5) 
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The Loekean state of nature Is fta state of peaoe, goodwl11, 
mutual assistanoe, and preservatlon. nS This notion of peaoeful 
co-existanoe apart from polltical rule is the distingulshlng note 
of the Lockean state of nature from the same state of nature as 
conceived b,. !homaa Hobbe.:;;1n his treatise Lexiathy. HoI' waa 
thlt a chance occurrence, for Looke'a Second Treati.e, though 01-
tenllbl, designed to continue the retutation of Sir Robert Pl1-
.er's Patrlar9b1 begun in the ll£lt Tr,at&.e, waa actuallJ almed 
at a retutation of Hobbe.'. theory of the atate.9 
The Hobbe.lan stat. of nature ls a condltion of unending war, 
not mutual peace. _en are naturally anti-aocial for the following 
reaaon. "In the first place, I put for a general inclination of 
all mankind a perpetuall and restlesse d •• lre of Power atter pow-
er, that a ..... th only in D.ath. And the cause of this is not al-
wa1. that a man hopes for a more intense delight than he has al-
read1 attained tOJ but because he cannot assure the power and 
.. ana to llve well, whioh he hath present, without the acquisition 
of more.ulO Fear and inseourlt,. eventuall,. coerce men Into form-
ing a political soclet,., the sovereign ot whIch la given absolute 
8 IbId" ch. ), seot. 10, pp. 126.127. 
9w• S. Carpenter, "Introduction to Two Treatilea ot Clvil 
Government b,. Jonn Locke" (We. York, 192JT; p. x. --
l°'l'homu Hobbes, LeViathn, Pt. I, eh. 111 !he Bnfl18h fh1lf,oPher. !£m!. Bacon is!. !!t::, ed. Edwin Burtt-nrework, 1939), 
P. 1 • 
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control over his subjeots. Hobbes is therefore a supporter of ab-
solute government and of positive law over natural right, inasmuch 
as men entering civil society trom the state of nature relinquish 
control over themselves entirely to the sovereign power. ll 
Locke, the defender of natural rights and of limited consti-
tutional monarchy, begins with the same premise as Hobbes, i.e., 
of a state ot nature antedating civil sooiety. Yet if he is to 
draw a theory of government the direct opposite of Hobbes's trom 
the study of this pre-political state, he must change the essen-
tial disposition of "natural man" from evil and wanton aggressive-
ness to good and peaceableness. Hence, though inconveniences 
arise in the state of nature to hasten their decision, men are not 
driven, but freely choose, to enter political lite. With such a 
measure ot freedom in their actions, they are able to establish a 
constitutional regime. whioh will preserve as far as possible the 
na~lral rights which they had in the state ot nature by providing 
an adequate and impartial enforcement of the law of nature. 
W. T. Jones comments: 
Thus, though both Hobbes and Locke use a strictly 
utilitarian argument to justif1 their respeotive state 
organizations, they reach radioally different conclu-
sions about the kind of organizations which utili tar-
11 IbId" pt. II, c. 17: "I authorise and give up my right of 
governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this 
condition that thou give thy right to him and authorize all his 
aotions in like manner. • • • This is the generation of that great 
Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that mortal 
god, to which under the immortal God, we owe our peace and de-
fense." (English Phil" p. 177) 
I 
I' 
" 
ian considerations can justify. Hobbes thinks that they justity (and indeed make expedient) an absolute and un-
limited monarch. Locke thinks that utility can justify 
only a sovereign whose conduct is limited by the same 
moral order in which his subjects share, whose sole rai-
son d' ~'r. is to produce the various conveniences which 
thOse sUbj;cts desire, and whose continuanoe as sover-
eign is conditional UPi~ his willingness and ability to 
perform this function. 
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In the above quotation, attention is drawn not only to the 
differences between Looke and Hobbes In theirolvil organIzations, 
but also to their common ground of agreement, i.e., that states 
are established not out of natural impulse, but for utilItarian 
purposes. Hence, on the one hand, Locke is in agreement with the 
scholast1c tradItion that government is responsIble to the commu-
nIty under the moral law; yet, on the other hand, he agrees with 
Hobbe. that government i. a utIlitarian device to further the pri-
vate interests of Individual membera. ll 
Though not a po11tical soaIety, the Lockean state ot nature 
Is a society under law. "The state of Bature has a law of Nature 
to govern it, whieh obliges everyone; and reason, which is that 
law, teaches all mankind who w1l1 but consult It, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in hIs life, 
llw. T. Jones, Masters 2! Political Thought (New York, 1949), 
II, 156. 
llSablne points out quite clearly how Locke is an incons1s-
tent amalgam of the medieval tradition of government with its no-
tion of the oommon good as the natural end of civil society and ot 
Hobbes"s new individualism which stresses private interests in a 
utilItarian society. (Sabine, pp. 524-525) See also ah. III, 
Pp. 71-74 tor comments on Locke's sense of social responsibIlity. 
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liberty, and possessions."14 The law of nature therefore confirms 
that complete freedom and perfect equality which are essentia.l for 
the state of nature. The social force of the law, however, is 
largely nega.tive, namely, that no one should interfere with ano-
ther's activity. Positive social action to assist one's neighbor, 
or group activlty toward a common goal are not required by Locke 
a8 part or the law of nature, except In the following rather vague 
provlao: "Everyone, as he Is bound to preserve himself and not 
qult his statlon wllfully, so by the 11ke reason, when his own 
preservation comes not Into competition, ought he, as much as he 
can, to preserve the rest of manklnd, and not unless It be to do 
justice on an offender, take away or impair the 11fe, or what 
tends to the preservation of the llfe, liberty, health, limbs, or 
goods of' another. ttl$ Locke adds that "everyone has a right,·' 
though not necessarily a duty, "to punish transgressors of that 
law of I'lature to such a degree as may hlnder its violation.H16 
Gough takes exception to the phrase, "When his own preserva-
tion comes not into competition"; he notes that Locke does not 
consider the possibillty of conflict between publlc and prlvate 
Interests except an the comparatively low level of self-
preservation. "But 'most ot the gigantic conflict. of wll1 in 
14 e.G •• ch, 2, aect. 6, pp. 119-120. 
l$Ibid. 
16 Ibid,. sect. 1, p. 120. 
human hJ.etol'Y. mothol" hlOtwenn 1r1l::U.\t1d.ual~ Qtt 2,"VO'U!'C, talcO !)ls.oG 
on a level where t naU .... r.u'tHlQ;:. ... vatlon. 1s not 1n~:r~ed1at31~r, but 0011 
lru:U,l,"ectly 1nvolv&d..*"11 T;ms,!ls dougb notes, I~o(ike did not Di!)-
~n ~o "alve the oOr!'l1)lexaud difficult problerl 0:1: the I"")lationahlp 
beween the lnd1vldue;l unGt sooiety_ This pOint w111 be n'tOt'e 0'\11 ... · 
dent in Chnpt~l" Th!*$€). in ''lhioh Lool,.' s theo17 or ;;aooloty. tln.d in 
l)tu.Ytlcult~. hls tl'$Att~nt of 01'111 l"'ropo:rty, ~ (loftstdel"$l. 
Besl,le$ tum1ah1ng the baals to'!!' Lockets tha~ of nat~el 
1"1.t~t8f both ln the $~At. ot nat~ and 1n otvl1 fll.,ef.et1, ths la.. 
or nat'tU~ 1a tha nON O~t10:Ml1.tt1 tor nit\n 1n the l~a1;o of nattU'<!l, 
b;l adh-e~nca to whloh. th$:r mal"lta!n ~a Sttlt0 of P~)J;10$, c;oodwt'll, 
atc. • •• .18 As the no,.. .. of til.ol~11t1. th8 pl~ln()!ple$ ot tb.~ la.. 
01" natm"'O ~, b. d.fJt~m13ed, alortg 'With the t.!ethoda by ~1hich 
tbo.\lO p~1nc1ples'att. d~du.o$d. 51J:t ~dorlck Pollook d.erlno!l 
Looke'. understanding of the law or nut~ath.ua: tf1uolte':a l}oltt! .. 
eal s:rfJt~ pw.-pOl"te. to be f'uundod on ll$tul"al law: that ia to lfJtrI. 
on l"l.U()8 of oonductwh1oh. the 11:ght of X'ltason, 't¥lthout aiel of' anr 
svao1a1 HY'elation., and. without ••• Wld.nS ,be extattlMe o:r author!-
'1 ot 1UX'/ f'OX'U ot C0018ty. oan d1,oOVG;t' as ~en$:tta111 app11cable to 
I-a 11*11"'* eu •• ' 
11aouSl.'PPfi 34-3$. no quotes Reinhold l~$!bWw, Tact C!!&~s\~.9 
Sit J4&$I.Ill4" oAll4£!1 £t ~_.I (194$). P. as,. 
lSg,.g .. , ell. 3, 8eot_ 19.pp*\ lat..)w;121. On thO' law at nat~ 
•• tne noN of _l~all'7' &00 ell. a, _ .. t. 6. 1'1'. 119->120. 
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man as a ratlonal belng.~19 The contents ot the law of nature for 
Locke .e~e certaln objectlve rules of oonduct, and the general 
method by whlch rules we~e deduced was "reason" speculating on the 
rational nature of man. 
Yet Locke intended more by the law of nature than Pollock In-
dicates. He believed that God, as the Creator of man and ma~erlal 
things, was the source of natural law. It was God's Will. there-
fore, that "no one should harm another in his lIfe, 11berty, and 
possessIons," because "they are His property, whose workmanshlp 
they are, made to laat durlng Hia, not one another's Pleasure. n20 
Reason therefore retlecting on man as a creature ot God as well as 
a ratlonal being determined the Lockean law of nature.2l Locke 'a 
difflculties with the law of nature lay in the applloatlon of rea-
son to rationally evldent first principles of being and moralIty. 
Hls epistemological theories given in the ESSay concerning Human 
UDderatandlns eatablish him as a sensist, tor whom objeotive cer-
titude for such principles is philosophically impossible.22 
19Sir Frederick Pollock, "Lockets Theo~ of the State," l£2-
ceedings 2! the British Academz, I (1903-1904), 240. 
20 ~, ch, 2. sect, 6, pp. 119-120. 
218 • e alao Ibid., ch, 11, sect. 135, pp. 184-185 for the law 
of nature as the expression of the Will of God. 
22 See JOhn Locke! An ESinY cgnc,rning Human Understand1ng, Sk. IV, ch, 3, aect. l:!he sllah =sIloao~ers, edt Burtt, p. 
327. Also Sk. II, oh. 1, sect. 5: EnslIsh --II., p. 249. No sya. 
tem of natural law principles, wbien is not derived trom per ~ 
evident prino1ples or beins, can cla1m philosophical certitude. 
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Yet ~ facto, both in the Essay concerning Human Understand-
ing and in his Essa;ys .Q!! the Law of Nature, Locke established a 
')3 
natural law based on reason and sense experience.~ 1~e arguments 
given therein are based on causality, in particular the causality 
required for the creation of rational beings. '1'he existence of 
men argues to the existence of a superior Rational Being as Crea-
tor. In keeping with His Divine '~nsdom .. the Creator established 
an end in life for human existence which becomes known to men as 
the natural law. Irhese arguments are sound, thoup.-,h lacking the 
philosophical certitude and objectivity of a reduction to first 
principles. 24 
Elsewhere Locke postulated that an ~ Eriori system of ethical 
principles could be established, in much the same way as a mathe-
matical system is built up logically from postUlates and theo-
rems. 25 Yet no ~ priori system of morality can be considered ade-
quate if the ideas of God and of man on which the system depends 
23Ibid., Bk. IV, ch. 10: English Phil., pp. 360-364. Also 
John Locke, Essays .2!!. .:!ill!. IJaw of Nature, IV: ed. W. von Leyden 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ~r; pp. 151-159. 
24 In these arguments, Locke defines reason as "the discursive 
faculty of the mind which advances from things known to thines un-
known and argues from one thing to another in a definite and fixed 
order of propositions." To which he adds: liThe foundations, how-
ever, on which rests the whole of that knowledGe which reason 
builds up and rai Jes as high as ~~eaven are the objects of sense-
experience."--Essays 2!!.the Law of Nature, IV: ed. von Leyden, 
p. 149. 
25EsSaY, Bk. IV, ch. 3, sect. 18: £n011sh Phil., p. 334. 
would be subjective to everyone. For no objective hierarchy ot 
essences ordered to a common end could be agreed upon by men who 
form their ideas of God and spiritual things like the human soul 
from It enlarging some of 
and reflection.,,26 
• • • their ideas received from sensation 
Equality 1n the state of nature demands for every man his 
rights of l1fe, liherty, and property without hindrance from other 
men.27 To preserve these natural rights, i.e., to see to the pro-
per observance of the law of nature in onets regard, another right 
must be allowed to men 1n the state of nature: the ri~~t to pun1sh 
transgressors of the law of nature. By the tact of complete 
equality, every man has the right ot sanction, or the being execu-
tor of the law of nature for himself: 
And that all men may be restrained from invading others' 
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law 
of Nature be observed, wh1ch willeth the peace and pre-
servation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Na-
ture is in that state put into everyman's hands, whereby 
everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that 
law to such a degree as may hinder ita violation •••• 
and if anyone in the state of Nature may punish another 
for any evil he has done, every- one may do so. For in 
that state of perfect equality, where naturally there i. 
no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what 
one may.do 1n prosecution28f that law, everyone must 
needs have a right to do, 
26 Ibid •• Bk. II, ch. 23, sect, 33: English Phil., p. 305. 
27c•a., ch. 2, sect. 6, PP. 119-120: nno one our)lt to harm 
another in his life, lIberty, and possosaions." 
28IbId" ch. 3, sect. 19. PP. 126-127. 
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Such a position, that all men should be the executors ot the 
law of nature tor themselves, is ha.zardous unless :men are quite 
rational 1n hlleir dealings with one anoth.~. Yet, as Aaron notes, 
"Men are never wholly rational. And a manta rapac1ty and greed 
m1ght lead hIm to action wh1ch 18 contrary to the law ot nature 
and oontrary to 1"ea50n."29 Without hlgher authority to settle 
dispute. among men 1n the state ot nature, a oonditlon, lf not ot 
war, at least ot "preoarious peaoe" must prevail.30 Looke h1maelf 
admits that "olvil government 1. the proper remedy tor tho incon-
venlences ot ~le atate ot nature, which must certainly be great 
when men may be judges 1n their own c8s8.,,31 Thus we see that 
complete equalIty, whioh is the foundation of men's natural rignt& 
in the atate or nature, i& tram another point of vicw one of the 
major reasons why men abandoned the state of. nature for the pro-
tection and inequality of civil society, 
The other characverlstic disposition of men 1n the state of 
nature i. pertect freedom. What Locke intends he~e is not li-
cense, rather, p.~tect freedom is the ~atlonal 11be~ty of men to 
order ~leir act10ns and dispose ot their persona and posseSSions, 
as they themselves think good, "wit.~1n the bound. of' the law of 
29 Aaron, p. 276. 
306219• 
31 ~I. e.G •• eh. 2, sect. 1), pp. 123-l~. 
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nature. "32 Thus men in the state of nature :may do as they wish, 
provided that they do not interfere with the equal rippts of 
others to the same freedom, Hane Kelsen believes that there is a 
close connection between personal freedom and the right of private 
property. This opinion will be treated later in the chapter.33 
Critics speculate whether Locke intended the state of nature 
as an historical reality or a oonvenient mental fiction, From his 
own words, it seems quite plain that the state of nature was, and 
is, a living reality: "[Slince all princes and rulers of 'indepen-
dent' governments all through the world are in a state of Nature, 
it 1. plain the world never waa, nor never wlll be, wlthout num-
bers of men in that state."34 Locke argues that sovereign rulers 
are in the 'state of nature toward one another because they have no 
human superior or law other than the law of nature to bind their 
relations, Likewise two strangers, meeting in,the "wilds of Amer-
ica/tape in the state of nature toward on. another, though each 
may belong to a political sooiety Inanother land.35 Aliens with 
respect to the legitimate authority of the land in whieh they are 
temporarily residing are also in the state of nature.36 Finally, 
32Ib1d., sect. 14, p. 124. 
33See pp. 36-37. 
J4~, ch, 2, sect. 14. P. 124. 
35Ib1d • J see a1ao ch, 7, sect. 91, pp. 161-162. 
36Ibldsl ch. 2, sect. 9, p. 121. 
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everyone is ln the atate of na~e until by his own consent, he 
beoome, a member ot 01vl1 aoclet1.37 
On tne other hand, Sir Prederlek Pollook declare. that Locke 
was tOl'Ced to begin wi th the s ta te or na ture to answer Hobbes and 
'llmer. Yet for him as for the ,ehoolmen, It was a "pertectly 
consclou, abatraotlon" rather than an attempt to trace the aotual 
origin ot aoole'T. "The question 18 what a man'. rights would be 
in the abaenoe of anJ po,ltlve Inatitutlons."38 W. T. Jonel, how-
e.er. t.ela that Looke may have had a double intention: "[A]l-
though tne contract theorl.ta may have well have believed in the 
hiatorlclt,y ot a atat. ot Bature, they are on the whole not so 
muob Interested 1n d •• cribing an hi.torical taot aa they are In 
.a.erttng the existence ot a moral tact. • • • BJ aaying, tor in-
stanoe, that in a atate ot lature, men are tree and equal, he 
[Looke] 40.a not .e ... 17 mean that there waa a t1me In the palt 
when men .. ere tre. and equal in tae t J he meana rather to a •• ert 
that they ought to be tree and equal."39 Thu. Locke Intended the 
state ot nature to be a no~ for civil 8001ety. aa .ell as an hla-
tOl"ical taot. 
37~ .eot. S, p. 119. The matte~ of oonaent to authority 
1a t~eaiid:fn oh. III, PP. 54-00. 
38p0110ok. p. 241. See al.o Sabine, p. $26. nIt the fiction 
about a state ot nature be la1d aa1de, th1. can mean only one 
th1ng, namely, that moral rule. are broader 1n the1r appl1oation 
than the rule. ot positlve law and are val1d whether gove~nt. 
obsel'Ve them or not." 
39Jonea, pp. 163-164. S •• alao Gough, pp. 29-30. 
I 
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Lockets problem here was how to domonatrate the natural pri-
ority' or the rights of the indivic:lual over those of the state. 
!he conoept of the hIstorical state ot nature was a conventional 
term In s.vent.en~l century political theory; moreover, it was a 
convenIent apparatus for Indicating that moral sphere In whl4h the 
indivIdual with ita rIghts was prior to the 8tate.40 Locke could 
have achIeved the same results with a metaphysical comparison at 
the end of man with the natural end at the atate. But he choee 
the hIstorical approaCh perhaps because his senaist epiatemology 
l.tt room tor doubt about the valIdity ot his metaphysical conclu-
aIona.41 Yet diffIculties aroae trom his choice. It was ques-
tionable how much a description of a primitive society of lsolated 
indivlduals could influenoe the practio~. ot a complex oontempo-
rary civl11zation. Locke solved this diffioulty by stipulating 
that great numbers of men even in his day were stl11 in the state 
ot nature.42 '1'h1s solved the problem ot the contemporaI7 utilitl 
of the state of natux-e) but opened up the further question ot ita 
ult1mate atatu., h1.tox-ical realIty ox- mental fiction tor the 
sake ot abatraot discue.ion, as mentioned above. 
400ough, pp. 70-71. The basic &slIwnpt1on here 18 that Locke 
wanted to establish constitutional government ba.ed on the conaent 
or ~e people. S.e tni. Chapter, pp. 18-19. alao JOhn Looke, 
"Pretace to Two Treati •• s ot Govemment," in WqrlSl (London, 1114), 
II, 101. 
41S8• n. 22, p. 22. 
420r• sup., p. 26. 
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In bis analysis ot property in the state ot nature and In 
civil society, Locke was almost exclusively occupied with the eco-
nomic conditions ot the state ot nature, and the exercIse of the 
right or property wIthin that state. Perhaps Locke intended that 
civil property regulations should be somehow influenced by state 
of nature property institutions. Yet, as we shall 8ee later, the 
manner ot acquiring and disposing ot property was radically dif-
terent in the two statea. Part ot this transformation was effec-
ted by the introduction ot money, whioh will be described in the 
tollowing •• ction atter an analysis ot the earlier state of nature 
economlos. 
r 
Part Two - Prop8~ty In the State ot Natu~e 
Locke's juntltlaatlon ot private property as a natural right 
whloh 1s derived tram the personal actlvlty ot the owner ls well 
reasoned. To be undera tood pl'operly. it should fira t be viewed in 
ita ent1rety brietly. and then systematically oonsidered 1n ita 
logical development. !his w111 be OU~ prooedure. 
Looke's justification ot the right ot personal property in 
the state of nature 1s thus summarised: God gave the earth with 
its goOd8 to men in common. Unless each man had the natural r1ght 
to appropr1ate for h1mself certain things out of the common stock 
tor hi. own use and oonsumpt1on. he would starve and God·s g1ft ot 
the earth to men would be in va1n. Bverr man haa a property in 
his person and in his labor as the aotivity ot his person, "tne 
work ot his hands." To exeroise the natural right to property, 
man uaes the speo1t10 tunotion ot hi8 labor and the usefulness to 
himselt of tn. goods which he appropriates. An acourate measure 
of their usefulness is wastage. Those material goods which wast. 
(1.e., apoil o~ are kept without purpos.) in a man'a possession, 
are not useful to him, and hence not hi. property any more. Man 
has a title by his labor not only to oonsumer goods, but also to 
produotive goods, o.g., land, to the extent that these goods are 
a180 put to effective us. by the individual. Land unused by one 
man beoames automatically the potential property of anothe~ who 
30 
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would lay claim to It by the labor of fencing It 1n and cultiva-
tlng It, etc. 
In tne appropriatlon ot goods, the equal rights of others to 
property 80 limit an individual'. rIght tbat he may treely appro-
pl'iate onl,. tt.,bette thel'. Is enough and a8 good lett in common tor 
otber •• "43 In the atate ot nature, however, this problem 18 of 
mino!' importance because land 1. abundant and enough ot 1 t ls ot 
unlform value. Both in the ear17 ag •• ot the world, and, in 
Looke'a own day, "In aome inland vaoant plaoea of Amerioa," a man 
could appropriate all tne land he could u •• without harm to hla 
ne1gbbora.44 Wlth the introduction or mone7, however, the abun-
dance ot available land beoome. ourtailed. Thi. aapect ot Lock.'s 
theory w111 be handled 1n the tinal aeotion ot thls ohapter and in 
Ohaptel' Three. The above suffioiently outllnea the property 
theory tOI' the state at nature ,betore ~. use ot money. POI' e&8e 
and clarity ot trea~t, thia part or Chapter Two wl11 be dlvide4 
into three .ections: tirat, property 1n perishable goods; then, 
I property in land, and tinally, the introduction at money. 
A. Property in Perlshable Goods 
Locke'a atarting-poin' in hla fopmal treatment ot prop.rtf ls 
430 ,6,. ch. S, •• ot. 26, p. 1)0. 
44Ib14t ••• ot. )6, p. l34. 
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the pr1nc1ple that God gave the world to men 10 common.45 HI. a1m 
in the seotion on pl'Operty 1s to show how individual men come to 
have private property without violatlon ot that original cammon 
grant, "and that wIthout any express campact of all the common-
e ••• "46 In a tew words, thereforo, Locke assert. the Independence 
ot hi. property tneorr tram othera ourrently in vogue. Hl. ao-
knowledged opponent, 81r Hobert Filmar, held the opinlon that 
kings, having their royal authority by right of successIon tram 
Adam, the oommon father ot all. were 801e property owners wlthin 
their atates. God gave the world, acoording to Pllmer, to Adam 
and his heir. in suoce.slon who would dl.tribute the property of 
the kltlgdom to their subjeots tor us., but roetaln the ownership ot 
the land in thelr own persons.47 In beginning his treatment ot 
propert.1. Locke clai •• that it 1& not enough to point out the dif. 
fioultle. in Filmer'. theory, whioh was th. wark ot the Flrlt 
k!st,.!.: he l'l'1Ust establish his own theory, based on the supposi-
4S~lS.' aect. 24, p. 129. 
46Ib1da 
47S1r Robert Filmer, "Pretace to ~.or!a~loD' ~ Arl.to-
t •• •• E~~ Sll. GSIC" 1n Pa,plareba and. 
nth,r ~ Robt~l, ed. Peter La81eit(Ox-
tord, 19 9 , pp. 1 7-1~1 • tipat government in tn. world was 
roonaroh1cal, 1n the father ot all tle8h. Adam being commanded to 
multiply and people the earth, and to subdue It, and havlng domin-
ion gl ven him over all ere. turea, was therebr the monarch ot the' 
whole worldJ nane ot hi. posterity had any rlght to posse.8 any-
thlng, but b1 hl. grant or permi8sion, or b7 8uocess1on trom him. 
the earth (.al th the P8alm1. t) ha ttl he gl ven to the children ot 
men, whlch shows, the title come. tt-om the fatherhood." 
tion that God gave the world to all men, i.e., t 
posterity without distinction.48 
Furthermore, Looke indio~tes that in his 
private property "without any express compact ot all the common ... 
ers. 1t By this phrase, he informs the reader that he will not 
strictly follow the theories ot two previous natural law defenders 
ot private property, Grotius andPufendorf. These two held that 
./ 
the individual possessed his property by a virtual oontract be-
twean himself and the other members of the community.49 For Locke 
this oontract 1s superfluous, since, as he states later, man poa-
seases in hi. own person the great foundation of property. i.e., 
Its justitication, apart trom the consent ot others.SO 
48 4 C.G., oh. S, sect. 2 , p. 129. See also John Locke, First 
Treatis.-o1 Civil Government (An B8~l concernin~ Palse Prinoi-
I¢es), ch:-\ •• ecta. 29-40: in!Wo eat!ses olivll Government, 
eryman edition, PP. 21-29. Here tooke refutes Filmer's text 
quoted above, on the original grant to Adam as proprietor ot the 
whole world. In oh. 7. sects. 73-77, pp. $1-56: and in ch. 9, 
sects. 8$-87, pp. 60-62, ~e further argues against the claim of 
subsequent monarchs to dominion over land in their domains by in-
heritanoe from Adam. 
49See Hugo Grotiu8, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 19~);-Bk. !I, cS: 2, sect. 5, p;-fS9. 
Also Samuel Putendort, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, I9~Bk. IV, cS: 4, sect. 4. p.~. 
SO~, ch. a. aect. 44. p. 1)8. Richard Schlatter suggests 
that the pn~aae.without any exp~eas compact etc.," is primarily 
a refutation ot Pilmer'. argument against Grotlu. and Putendort 
that the man who held hi. estate from the king had greater securi-
ty or posseasian than the man whose title waa baaed on the consent 
of all men. Looke, by directly deriving property from the law of 
nature. avoided Filmer's contention. S.e Richard Schlatter, Pr1-
.!!!!. Propertl (London, 1951), p. 1S3. -
.1I~ 
Locke ba ••• tbe 3ustltlcatlon for ht. pJ'lnolplo that God .. va 
the ~ to men in ~J on both Naeon and the "xt Or the Old 
T •• tament_ BOlon teaohea ~, _,.8 too_. \bat ".,ft· being onoe 
bom have Ii rlgbt t10 thebt pNdfIYatlcm. and oonaequent17 to _t 
an4 d1'*1nk and such othe". thins- .a natUJ.'IG atto!'da tor th:eU sGb-
a1.te8O •• -S1 Tbe Old 1' •• tamentl add. welsht t,o thl. arS'f.ll1&utl wbm 
it notea that 004 SA •• the .~ to A4a aM hS.. posted_, aM 
asa1n to Noah and b18 .u~ •••• II ~ pOaae •• IOll to~ the UM of 
all ~51 Bel .... of' \beN _gameD' •• boWY •• , In 1'.elf d ...... 
'~_8 whetbel' 1m1a ~ of the ~ 1. po.ltl •• e. -satlft. 
Aa wW be ."telea lhOJt1slr. Locke lnte:fP:"'ed tb1. c~'" 
ot po ••••• s.ou u DlPtl".. 1 ••• " ~.pOl .... l0. of the -utb, 
mtl1 1ndlv!4uals .. ~la~ papta at tme ea:rf)b. t~ tlb.oItael" ... 
Poa1'1". oo.utd.tJ'o:t pO.8 ••• ~., !.n whioh •• rO~l,. -P'H to 
un 1n4!vI4ua117 0. In u-cptfttloa ... , t. 0WAe4 bJ' aUtle_iu., 
would 'be lmpo.albl. b U. Leo .... k te 01: ratnlR., 'the nate or 
"IU It. n • I dAta D1 
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nature is a state ot perfect freedom and complete equa11ty, wtth 
no common superior among men; pos1t1ve commun1ty ot possess1ons, 
on the other hand, Imp11es some torm of civil government to handle 
the d1stribution 01' labor, profits, etc.53 
GrantIng this prem1se, Locke takes the seoond step in his 
theory when he Ii:lYs: "God, who hath given the world to men in com-
mon, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best ad-
vantage ot ltte and convenience."S4 Not authority, or the consent 
ot men, but reason, i.e •• every man's private interpretation ot 
the law ot nature, will be the controlling factor in the division 
ot the community ot property. 'lAnd though all the truits it nat-
urally produces, and beasts it teeds, belong to mankind in oammon, 
••• yet being given tor the use 01' men, there must of necessity 
be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can 
be ot any use, or at all beneticial, to any particular man." This 
ia the tirst and most fundamental justification of the natural 
right ot private property. "!he fruit or vension which nourishes 
the wild Indian ••• must be his, and 80 hts, i.e., a part of him 
53~, ah. ), sect. 19, pp. 126-121. Otto Gierke comments 
that natural law phtlosophers in Locke's day generally acoepted 
the original community ot possessiona as being negative: "Thinkers 
atill retained the traditional assumption ot an original community 
01' possessions, but while the Middle Ages had believed that this 
oommunl0 ifleeeva had issued 1n a posit1ve system of joint-
ownership, the Sohool of Natural Law 1nterpreted it as be1nf only 
a communio ne;attva, ••• the entlre negation ot property. --
Otto Glerke,atural Law and the Theo£Y of Sooietx, trans. Ernest 
Barker (Cambridge, Ing., m4,J,P. 103. -
54 Ibid" ch. 5, sect. 2$, p. 129. 
that another can no langeI' bave any J'i~t to it, before it can do 
any good tox- the support of' his 'lite.""S 
On the one hand, men clearly have need ot mate~ial goods 1n 
thIs lire far s.lf-preservation and "the best advantage or lit. 
and convenlence.n$6 On tho other hand, material goods, though put 
1n the world by God tw the use ot men, have no natupal ordination 
to one man x-ather than a.nother. lienee men must have a natuJ'al 
right or private properv,y to approppiate what was previously com-
mon, i.e., unolaimed. Hana Kelaen and others argue that the prim. 
Itive act ot appropriation i. not an exeroia. ot tn. rIght ot pri-
vate proper'.." but rather ot the right ot personal use and oon-
aumptlon. Concerning Looke'. argument tbat rruit or venison must 
belong to an Indian berore he caD conaume 1t, Kel.en comments. 
It standa to reason that this argll1Dent can pJ'oVe the 
neoessity ot indivIdual property only in article. ot 
tood which man Immediately needs ro~ hi. 8ubsistence, 
tor it is only w1 th respeot to theae articles that ex-
cluaive disposition on tbe part ot the individual 1a 
pequlred. But alnoe Looke wan_. to jus tI.t)' 1nd1 vldual 
pt-opes-ty in gones-al f he doee not con t1nue to argue In thia direction leadIng to an impasse. lie emphasizea 
tbe speoific mean a by whioh man appropr1ates the arti-
ole. ot food and by whlch be may appronr1ate other 
things also. And th1s means 1. labor.~1 
Kelaen interprets Lock. t • use ot need here as striot subsis. 
S5Ib1d• 
S6Ib1d, 
S1aana Kela.n, "Foundations or Democracy," Ethios, LXV! 
(October 1955), No.1, pt. 2, 87. 
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tence need only, not human needs in general, which extend far be-
yond the requirements of self-preservation. Undoubtedly, Locke'. 
example of the Indian and the venison lends some plausibility to 
Kelsen's argument. Yet elsewhere Locke indicates that, though be-
ginning with stark needs, he intended to expand the term to in-
clude all that man would tind useful. or even convenient, limited 
of course by the avoidance of waste and the equal rights of 
others.S8 Kelsen's second contention that labor alone, not need, 
justifies property is 11kewise refuted.59 
"Though the earth and all inferior creaiJures be common to all 
men, yet every man has a property in hi. own person. This nobody 
has a right to but himself. ft6o Aaron refers to the above state-
ment 1.8 HI. very doubtful principle • • • according to the legal 
58~, ch, $, sect. 25. p. 129: HGod who hath given the 
world to men in common, hath alao given them reason to make use of 
it to the best advantage of 11fe and oonvenience. The earth and 
all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of 
their being.- See alao Ibid" aeet. 33, pp. 132-133. 
59Kelsen's main pOin~, for which the above remarks are intro-
duo torr, is that property is to be justified as an exercise of 
personal treedom. Beginning with the Lockean principle that "a 
man's property is in his own person," Kelsen interprets this pro-
perty to be man'. personal freedom. Per.onal labor and the fruit. 
of one's labor are likewlse extenslons ot fr$edam and hence one's 
property. The wsaImes8 of the theory Is that whIle property may 
be justlfled aa an extension of personal freedom, all other rights 
are likewise justifiable on the same basis. In any given situa-
tion then, no priority of property rights over other rights or 
viee-versa can be established, since all are legitimate exprele 
sions of personal freedom. See Kelsen, pp. 86-88 for the complete 
development of this theory. 
60 ~, Ch. 5, sect. 26, p. 130. 
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code of most countries. u6l IUs reasons for that opinion aaybe 
the following. Pirst ot all, in legal terminology property is 
usually considered in the striot sense as relating to external 
goods. Only analogously then does one have a property in one's 
own person, as a being endovrod wi th natural rights. 62 Further-
more, in a oomplex legal society personal rights are closely re-
stricted by social and legal duties to other citIzens and to the 
community. An individual is never the proprietor of his being in 
an unrestricted sense, as Lockets statement might indioate at 
first sle.,ht. 
Is Locke's principle therefore limited in applioation to oon-
dit10ns ot the state ot nature, where sooial relations are tew and 
no common superior exi.ts to regulate men's activity for a oommon 
good? The answer perhaps 1s contained 1n the clause, "Though the 
earth and all inferior oreatures be common to all men. nO) Looke 
is summarizing here witn reference to property hi. arguments in 
the First Troatise against Filmer. Filmer claimed for Adam and 
his heirs 1n succeasion an absolute dominion over the whole earth, 
both men and all interior oroatures. In this way. Adam and his 
heirs were sovereign lords of all men and sole proprietors or Na-
61 Aaron, p. 277, n. 2. 
62See Pollock. P. 243: "[TJhe rights of every man to personal 
safety and reputation and so forth, are not marketable, or trans-
ferable, and are wholiy distinct 1n k1nd from rights of property." 
63£&., 011. 5, sect. 26, p. 130. I 
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tu~.'a goods.64 Locke retutes Pllme~ b7 alao using the Old Teata-
ment to ahow that Adam had not dominion OV8X' hi. tollo. J-ational 
belngs by the same grant a. he had dOll1n1on OV81' Ullvlng things ot 
the 8uth. N6S Moreovel'l, Locke prove. that Adam had no pl'llvate do-
ain10n over the goode or the earth, but a doa1n1on shaped in coa .. 
mon with the pest ot mank1nd.66 Locke' •• tatement that man bas a 
property In h1a own person I'll.,. thus be • bl'let l'esume ot two argu-
men ts drawn rz.o •. the Flrs t Treati.e. the .ar~ is cOJ1llon to all 
men, 8eoond1,., man, having a right ot, propert;r in hi. own person, 
cannot be aubjeoted to the dom1n1on o~ another human being . like an 
anImal 01" othel' intenor oreatU1'8" Thus Locke's principle need 
not be con.14ered a CQ4a of' rugged individualisM, but a reaS8811'-
tlon ot the tun<1amental human dlgnl ty of DlfUl, I.e., his indl vidual 
orientation to an Hnd beyond human, tinite purposes. 
"Th. labour or his bod,. and the ,ol'k of' his handa we _,. aa,. 
al'a properll hla.n67 Tn!s pl'lnciple i8 undoubtedly t~e and 
pHlau.nrorthy. Bv81'1 man must own hie labol', since in DlviD. PI'O-
64o,e,ryat£9RI HDQQ Arll~9tllt. eto., pp_ 187-188. POl' tn. 
polltloa dominion ot Adam and his heirs over otnar men, .e. alao 
~a~~t.~ftk. b7 811' Bobert Fllmel'. in Pairiarft!, ~ ¥~.£ p2.1~19'1 
fopka eto., 04. Laalett, III. p. S8.~ •• slett. notation ot 
i)atrial"oha 18 In "Heada of Di.oour ..... aocoNing to a ne. 0 .... 
bridge vera ion ot the worK, not accord1ng to the chapter h.adings 
In the Chl ••• ll .ditIon, whiCh here would be.ch. 1, sect. 4. 
6.$F'r.~ Artit&ll. ch. 4, •• eta. 21-28. pp. 16~1. 
66 Ib1a., aects. 29~O, pp. 21-29. 
070•0,. Ch. S. aect. 2S, p. 130. 
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Idence labor ls tae ordlnary means by whlch a man sustalna hlmself 
and hls dependent.. A wage.laborer owns hl. labor to the extent 
that he i. entItled to a just compenaatiOD trom the employer tor 
who.e benetl' he employed his labor. me qUestlon here, ho.ever, 
i. not 80 muoh over man'. rIght at property In hla labor, a8 rath-
er hi. rlght of property In the .trects ot his labor, 1.8., mate-
r1al goods whlob are external to hlm.elt. 
What.oever then, he remove. out of the ltat. that Na-
ture ha1)h provided and lett it in, he hath mixed hi. 
labW with it, and jolned to it 80mething that ls hls 
own, and thereby make. It hI. property. It beIng by 
hlm removed trom tho common state Bature plaoed. it in, 
t t ha t.h 07 this labott aometIling annexed to It that ex-
clude. the common rlgh t ot other men. For thIs "labour" 
being the unquestioned property of tho labourer, no man 
but he can have .. rlg')lt to what that 1. once jolned tOt 
at least wh.t:e there ls enough and as good lett in common 
tor othetta.OO 
Thus Looke evolved a natural pight theol'7 ot property troll 
a ourloua oonjunotlon at older dootrines. To the baslc Idea that 
man bas a ~i8ht to whatever goods he can use ro~ preservation and 
growth, Looke jo1ued the dootrlne 'Ghat labol' oreate. a tltle to 
property in goods prevIously unola1med. Th1s joint theory Looke 
further modifled by hls deolaration tnat labor and Ita etrect. are 
the leglt1mate expression o~ human personalIty. Property thus 
come. to be owned under the doubletltl. ot labor-use and personal 
tre.4011.69 
68Ib1d , 
698 •• Cook, Introduction, p. xxvi. 
Looke is sometimes oited in support of a theory that produc-
tive labor 1s the absolutely f1rst (primogonius) title to private 
property.70 It seems doubtful whether Locke with his lack ,of 
ph1losophioal preoision In the llse of terms. would,d1stinguish be .... 
tween produotive labor and its ohlef rival, first oocupation, a8 
the absolutely first title to property. He used labor in the ge-
neric sense, meaning mants personal activity. With regard to con-
sumer goods right at hand, man'a labor was an aet ot appropria-
tion, or first oceupation. But in consumer goods requiring pre-
paration before use, and in the appropriation of land through cul-
tivation, the labor of man became productive labor, i.e., the 
transformation of a natural good from its primitive state to a 
more useful condition. Such a diatinction in title. to property 
would have considerably sharpened the accuracy of Locke'. property 
theory in the state of nature, but especIally in civllsociety.7l 
700ranted the natural and innate right of acquiring private 
property 1n tne abstract,' it is also true that no property belongs I 
to anyone by nature. The juridical fact or circumstance by which 
a person ca.ea to acquire property rIghts in a specified material I 
good 1s ca.lled 'his ti tlj to that pttoperty. 'lhere are original ti- ' 
tles to property, by wh ch an individual is the first to acquire 
actual ownership over a piece of property, and derived titles, by 
which one receives property from a tormer owner, as in I~eritance 
of a patrimony, etc. The questIon here is of original titles, and 
specifioally of the absolutely first title which is presupposed by 
the others. 
11See ch. III, pp. 67-68. Actually first occupation must be 
given the prior positIon as absolutely first title to property 
over productive labor. Labor presumes prior occupation of the raw 
material to be changed and thus made one's own. See Francis J. 
Haas, !!n ~ Society, 2nd ad. (New York, 1952), p. 265. 
B. Property in Land 
F1*cm ownership ot consumer goods 1n the atate ot nature, 
Looke prooeeds to mants ownership ot produotive goods. e.g •• land# 
"But the chler nJAtt«u:' of property ~ing now not the tpu1ts of the 
.arun and tne beasts that subsist on it, but tae earth itself, aa 
that whioh takes in and. ofU":M.es with it all the rest, I think that 
it 1s plain that pl"'Opertl' in that too i8 aoquiNd as the torme!'. 
As much land as a man tl11s, plants, improves, oultivates, and can 
use the produot ot, so much is his pro~ert,.. He by' his labor does 
aa it ftH enclose 1t trom the eommons .. lf72 The heart ot the argu-
ment hape, as also 1n the case ot perishable goods, 1s the oon-
~ 
junction ot the right ot effective use with the oonoept ot pex-son-
al. labol*'. 0n17 as muoh land 8.8 a man can use will become hls pro-
perty; and the t1tle through whloh he exerc1.es his natural rlgnt 
over this pllU'tlcular plot 1s productive labor.1l Locke t a other 
contention that a natural. right of pl'Opertl exists in land as the 
source or other oonsumer gooda, 1. 11kewlao sound. Human ex1s-
tence would. be very inseoure 1£ man could not provide for tb.~ f"u-
tur. 117 appropriating property in land as well as in consumer 
goods. It 18 acoording to h1s rational nature, by- wb.1oh he dif. 
ter. fi'om. all intel'ior O"a~8, that uncitn." Divine Providence man 
,F d ft 
720,G,t on. $, sect. 31, p. 132. 
130t. sup •• p. 41. 
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be master ot hls own acta and provide for tuture advantage a. well 
.s present enjoTment.74 
The equality and pertect freedom of men in the state ot na. 
ture, as well as the tact that God gave the earth to men In com-
mon, Indioate that the rights of others may aometim.s restrict in-
dividual property holdings. Accordingly, Locke stipulates that 
property in land and perishable good. is held subject to the con-
dltlon that "there is enough artd as good left in common for 
other •• "75 The clrcumstances ot the state ot nature were such 
that thls general provlso was sufficient proteotlon against wanton 
aggr~lon on the rights ot others. Much depended, however, on 
the scarcity ot laborers and the retarded rural economy ot the 
stat. ot nature. It was not the aotive operatlon ot prlnciples ot 
.oclal justloe whlch produced harmony among neighbor., but the 
lack ot an ocoa810n tor d1sagreement. W1th the growth ot the pop-
ulatlon, and espeolally wlth the introductlon ot money, the peaoe-
fulness ot the state ot nature came to an end. 
C. The Introduotion ot Money 
In the early stages ot the state of nature, eaoh laborer was 
74Pope Leo XIII, Re~ Novarum (On the Cond1tlon ot Labor), 
sects. 5-6: appendix to ~r,anlzat10n-or-the !oolal EiOn?!l oy 
Oswald von Nell-Breunlng, s .. , trans. Kirnard W. Dempsey, .J. 
(Ie. York, 1937), p. 368. Papal property theory .111 be consld-
ered In ch. IV, pp. 77-84. 
75 6 ~, ch. 5, sect. 2 , p. 130. 
considered as an independent productive unit, who gathered and 
reaped to sustain himself alone. Family considerations were omit-
ted by Locke. Furthermore, no indication is given how each man 
provided for hi. clothing and shelter except by his own unaided 
eftorts. Even the ownership of land was justitied on the baais of 
an immediate or .easonal provision of the basic toodstufts. The 
introduotion ot first-hand bartering, however, i.e., of one good 
tor another, was a bil improvement in tbe .tate or nature econom-
ics for two reasons. 76 First it showed a growing sense of fore-
thought on the part of tne laborer to obtain goods which he needed 
but could not easily produce by his own labor. Secondly, and much 
more important, barter revealed an incipient spirit of co-
operation between labor~r8 to provide tor one another's needs. 
Increased trade ot this type eventually suggested an elementary 
division ot labor and the beginnings ot an economic system.77 
Beginning with the earliest types of bartering, spreading and 
developing concomitantly with the increase in trade, was a new el-
76Ibid , sect. 46, p. 139. "And if he bartered away plums 
that .ouid Eave rotted in a •• ek, tor nuts that would last good 
for hi. eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the 
common stook, destroyed no part ot the portion ot goods that be. 
longed to other., as long as nothing perished uselessly etc ••• " 
7710te the important influence of barter on the development 
ot specialisation here: "Not unnecessarily it was noticed that 
some people or same regions .ere especially •• 11 adapted to produ-
c1ng special things, and it was observed that people who required 
many things could not specialize on a te. unless they could trade 
the1r special1t1es for other products."-- Bruce Winton Knignt, 
~onom12 Principle. !e Practice, revised ed. (He. York, 1942), 
p. 41. 
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ement in state of nature economics, which would revolutionize the 
entire system--money.78 Locke's account of the origin of money is 
as follows. Speaking of the prudent householder who bartered nuts 
for perishable plums, he says: 
Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, 
pleased with its color, or exchange his sheep for shells, 
or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep 
those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of 
others, he might heap up as much ot these durable things 
as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just 
property not 17ing in the 1argenesa of his possession, 
but the perishing of anTthing uso1essly in it. 
And thus came in the use of money; some lasting 
thing that men mIght keep without spoiling, and that, 
by mut».al oonsent, men would take in exchange7for the truly useful but perishable supports of lIfe. 9 
Locke thus traces the rise of money through the primitive de-
sire for brightly colored metal objects or sparkling pebbles, bau-
bles by which savages of all ages and climes have been fascinated. 
!hence he concludes to the use of money, i.e., some durable good 
that i. acceptable as a medium of exchange for truly useful con-
sumer goods. Elsewhere he adds that gold and silver, to which men 
have agreed to give a value, prior to civil society became a stan-
dard medium of exchange for perishable goods. 80 The simplicity of 
78Ib1d., p. 78: "Thus the significance of money lies in these 
facts: that speoialization i8 vital to Bocial econOMY. that ex-
change is indispenaable to specialization. and that money is 'the 
great instrument of exchange. t " 
79 e,G., ch. 5, aects. 46-47, pp. 139-140. Se. Lionel D. 
Edler Economics, Prineleles and Problems, 2nd edt (New York, 
1932J, P. S4S1or another aocount ot the origin of money. 
80 ~, ch. 5, seot. 37, pp. 134-135. 
I 
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Looke's theory oonceals a number of transition stages in whioh men 
are eduoated to the use of money. Some hierarohy of values must 
be evolved and made generally acceptable to all men in a given 
area, in order that these shiny objects may have more than subjec-
tive value as a medium of exchange.8l Likewise, the use of gold 
and silver in standard amounts as money indicates a high degree of 
eoonomic progress prior to the establishment of oivil society, 
though no mention of this is made by Looke. 
As noted above, the introduction of money to the state of na-
ture economics overturned the primitive oonditions originally de-
scribed by Locke. Trading boomed with tne aoceptanoe of a stan-
dard medium of exohange. Tbinga of unequal value were exohange-
able, and the differenoe paid in money with it. generalized pur-
cha8ing power tor goods at another time. As a standard of value, 
money provided a measurement in common terms for di8parate items, 
e.g., live8took, jewelry, e~o. But, moat important of all, money 
81The one distinguishing oharacteristic of money is its gen-
eral exchangeability •••• If an article passes freely from hand 
to hand as a medium of exchange, if it is aocepted readily as a 
matter of oourse payment of all debts and obligations, then that 
article i8 money, no matter what its oolor, shape, size, or compo-
sition."--Edie, p. 543. He goes on to add that general aooepta-
bility is a product of growth and evolution and tr~t money was a 
gradual invention. The tirst articles used as money were commodi-
ties ot beauty or of physical necessity. "Shells were an early 
form of money. They were used as ornaments because of their beau-
ty, and the, were used as money because .heir beauty gave them 
general acceptability as a means of payment." (Ibid., p. 545) 
Other more useful articles used as primitive medIa of exohange 
were: salt, skins, fUrs, etc. See also Charles Oide, PfinCiPles 
2l Political Economy, 2nd English edition (London, 1903 , p. 213. 
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did away with the restriction of wastage on the possessions of 
men. Gold and silver did not decay like perishable goods which 
rotted unless consumed. Unlike land, extra money in onets posses-
sion did not become common property for one in need to appropri-
ate. Money therefore was an easy way to accumulate extra property 
without wastage. Sufficient acc~~lation of money gave the owner 
muCh wider purchasing power. Thus money as a store of purchasing 
power came to represellt additional real property in goods and 
lands.82 Money, for example, bought additional consumer goods for 
which the possessor had not labored; money in sufficient quantity 
bought extra land which the individual had not cultivated, and 
hired laborers to work that land at a profit to al1. 83 
God gave the world to all men, but especially "to the use of 
the industrious and ratlona.l.,,84 Thus men of superior talent or 
means became the pioneers in a rapidly expanding economy. Grown 
wealthy through increased lands and crop production. they ineuced 
other men to give up :farm,ing and build mansions for them. Some of 
82Money has four basic functions: a) to serve as a medium of 
payments or exchange of goods, b) as a measure of value for dif-
ferent types of goods, oJ as a standard of debt payments, and d) 
as a store of value or purchasing power. See Knight. pp. 79-82. 
83To those temporarily without land or having little success 
in the cultivation of their own fields, the luro of a fixed sum 
and/or a share In the profits for working another's fields would 
be irresistIble. In the beginning the landlord worked in the 
fields with his helperCs] 80 as to retain the claim that his pro-
perty rested on labor, not moneTa 
84c.G" ch. 5, sect. 33, pp. 132-133. 
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these were retained as meohanics and farmhands in the pay of the 
master. Women wero employed to weave fine clothing for the master 
and his family, and again some were retained as permanent servants 
of the household. Freed from the obligations of servile work, the 
lord and his sons found opportunity to travel. Visits to other 
areas in turn faoilitated the rapid interohange of goods and ide-
as. New kinds of merchandise, new methods of farming, building, 
primitive manufaoturing gained ciroulation, as travel and commerce 
broke down the barriers between geographical localities. 85 
New standards and values sprang up or were imported from 
other localities. Property no longer rested on the simple title 
of personal labor alone, but the consent of men permitted exoess 
accumulations of. lands and manufactures. 86 Slave labor, intro-
duced by trading or warfare, provided additional manpower for ag-
rioulture and industry, but also oreated new social problems be-
tween free labor and slave labor. F..ducation through tutors, and 
later in schools, stimulated the demand for a stabilized, cultured 
way of life; property disputes mounted, and irate claimants sought 
85Charles Gide comments on early cammercial effort thus: "Ex-
ohange was as a matter of fact first practised among people and 
regions far distant and different from eaoh other. Diversity of 
products and customs resulted from diversity of natural environ-
ment." He notes also that the first merchants were wealthier in-
dividuals who had the means and leisure to travel: "At the begin-
ning, moreover, merchants ?lore persons of great note, who were en-
vied and feared, ranking higher than artisans and farme:t-8, and 
constituting a veritable aristocracy."--Charles Gido, Prinoiples 
2! Political Econamz, etc., pp. 201-202. 
86~, ch. $, seot. $0, pp. 140-141. 
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arbitration on an impartial basis. Thus civilized society was at 
hand, but problems had arisen which could be solved only by ttl6 
formation of civil government. Hence to remedy "the inconvenien-
ces of the state of nature," civil society was born.B7 
87 4 Ibid~. ch. 2, sect. 1), pp. 123-12. See also ch. 9, sect. 
123. PP. I7 -lBO, and ch. 11, sect. 136, p. lB6 for references to 
contention in the state of nature prior to civil society. 
CHAPTER III 
PROPERTY IN THg S"tA'l'E OP SOCIETY 
Part One • Man in Clvil 8001et1 
Man leave the atate ot nature tor civil aoolet1 because of 
tbr •• unaatiefied ne.d. J the need at an e.tabllahed known law, the 
need. of an 1aputlal judge to lnt.J'pJllet \hat law In partlcular 
o1roumatance., and tinalll. tne need ot an ad.quate .anction or 
pollee power to entorce ju.t decI8lon •• l The general end eP pur-
po.e unde1"111ng the aatlataotlon at t.l:le •• baaic needa 1. given by 
Looke thus. -The great and chler end, tbeNtOl"e, ot men's unlting 
into oommon.eal tha, and puttlng th .... 1 ve. under government. 18 
the preservatlon ot their property.n2 B.1 property. ot cour.e, 
Looke understands all the natural rights ot 11to, liberty, .tc.3 
1 . 
cfta,- cb. 9, aect •• 124-126, p. 180. In somewhat similar 
'erma,t. Thomas Aquinas t •• ches that human or poaitlve law ex-
lats to deolare, det.paine, and urge, 1 ••• , eDrOPe., natural law, 
8J declaration ot the law he meant tbe deduotion 01.' additlonal 
precepts, e.peclal11 tho •• ot the third rank, fro. tn. firat prln-
clple. ot natural law. Deter-mlnatlon ot natU1'al law meant to sup-
plement the general pl'lnclple. by more particular principles. In 
entorcing the law. since not all men can be led b1 re.son or admo-
nition, coerclon must bo use4. S •• ~ fll!O!OId.~.f la-Ilao, 
q. 9S. apt. 2 0 I <m,ra Off.1~ Parma iCr.etc. ,I,tJ. Also la 
Dltll LIbERt B¥Qloo£MI, • , leet. 12, XXI, 179. 
2 e.G •• Ch. 9, •• ot. 124, p. 180. 
'Ib"., .oot. 123, p. lSO. 50 
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In oth.~ words. Locke sees man In the state or nature as giving up 
ce~tain ~iqhta to be able to enjoy his ~emainlng rights with 
~eater freedom. Perfect freedom and complete equallty resulted 
10 oonfu.lan and a state of precarious peace in the later atages 
of the state ot' nature, e8peola11Y' atter the growth ot the popula-
tion and the use ot money. Henoe some rreedom waa 8urrendered to 
civIl societY' ao that the freedom of other rights, especially the 
rl~~t ot private property, could be enJ01ed wltb seourity_ 
'1'0 sattar, the needs given above, man in the state ot nature 
had to give up two "natural" powers when be entered civil societY" 
the power ot oomplete •• If-determination w1 thin the law ot natUJ'>8, 
and the power ot executIon ot the law of natu"_ By the first 
power a man 11vlns 1n the state ot nature, Gould do whatever he 
wished tort h1s own pl'e8orvation and that ot mank1nd, provlded he 
obeyed the unwritten law ot nature, 1 ••• , the d1ctate. ot his own 
r8880n.4 !hi. aame power 1n civil society he "give. up to be rec-
ulated by law8 Dade by the sooletJ. 80 far forth as the proserva-
tlon ot hl.elf and the ~.st of that society shall require."' 
The tirst power ls 11mlted, though not abrogated. The second 
power, that ot personal execution 01' the law at nature, Is entitte-
11 surrendered to clvll 8001e'Y. Heno.torttl hia duty in this mat-
ter la "to assist the executive power 01' the aocietJ, a8 the law 
4Ib1d., ch, 2, sect. 4. PP. 118-119. Alao sect. 6, p. 119. 
5Ib14., en. 9, seot. 129, p. 181, 
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th.~eot shall requlre."6 
Yet, though to ol~cumvent the limitations of' the state ot na-
ture, men surrender same ot thei~ pe~8onal freedom to clv!l socle-
'1. the power ot olvU govern:ment "can never be supposed to ex-
tend turther than the oommon good, hut 18 obliged to 8.cu~e eveP,y-
anets property by providing against thoae three detects above-
mentioned .bloll make the State of llature 80 W18at. ~nd unea",."7 
Within thla context. 1t m1ght seem that the oommon good 18 ;re. 
strioted to the sum total of' all indiv1dual goode w1thin the 
8tat •• 8 Yet ta1m ••• to Locke demands that the a1m or the Two 
-
~ .. tlsel ~ 01v&1 Gov~ent be kept 1n m1nd to govern the Inter-
pretatlon ot part10ular details. Locke's primary intentton, as 
stated in the tt~etaceJ tt was to establish const1tutional govern-
ment based on the conaent of the people .. 9 One ot the na tUl'lal 
rIght. whioh he cought to protect was the sanctity of' indivIdual 
property againat arbi t1"&1'1 state Interference.10 Consequently. he 
6 Ibidr .. , aect. 130, p. 181. 
7~ldt' .ecta. 12), 124, pp. 179-180. 
8Bdmund Wh1take1", A H1M01"l ot §gOllomlo Idea~ (tlew York, 
1943), p. 43 I "The good-olgtand, accordIng toocke, waa the 
aum of the separate goods or objectIve. of the individuals who 
.ere .. socia ted together to form the Engllsh nation •••• What-
ever the men .ho campo.ed societ,. wanted, by that f'act becQme the 
aoclal good." . 
9Locke,\lory eto., I, 101. 
10ct• the numerous references to ,. the pre.erva tion of proper-
ty" a8 the cbl.r end tor wh10h men enter Clvi1
6
"oc,etYI .2..t.!!.t.. 
cb. 1, sect. ), p. 118, eh. 8, .ect. 95, PP. 1 4-105 etc. 
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was naturally led to curtaIl the activIty of the state to bare es-
sentials, 1.e., the preserva.tion ot law and ordor, and the en-
foroement by publI0 authority of oontractual agreements among pri-
vate indivIduals. A aomplete notion of the oo.mmon good should in-
clude the demands ot 80cial, as well as commutatIve, justice; the 
rl,~ht. of the members ot a eonmnmlt1 preoisely as members should 
be safeguarded. All should be insured the opportunIty of acquir-
ing a suffioiency of material goods and other benefit. ot 80elal 
organlzat;lon. Fut-tb.ermore, oertain publio good "orks should be 
undertaken by the elvil authority, whoJ:'e prIvate InItiatIve may be 
Ineftect1ve. or even Injurious to the average citizen, e.g., pub-
110 health facilitIes, postal servIce, etc.11 Yet, however linit-
od Ii state's authority -1 be. it fosters a OOrorJ'lon good simply by 
~~e prese~tIon or law and ordo~ on th~ level of oommutative jus-
tice. Hence, Locke'S civil society possessed a real, though lnad-
equate, common good whloh existed for all the oitlzens alike. 
Looke 1. halled aa the "ohamplon ot individualism," partly 
because he set as narrow l1mits a8 possible to the state'. power. 
but more justly becau8e be l"8cognized the tundamental trutb that 
"government 18 all instrument to be used tor the good of indlvld-
llFt-anola J. Haas indicate. the narrow limite allowed for 
govol"'nment Intervention in private property thus: "Generally 
speaking, .eltare 1a prORoted beat by allowlng the wIdest margIn 
ot freedom to prIvate 1nItlatlv&, and acoordingly. the state ahall 
lntel"vene onl1 when private 1nitiative has 01ear11 fal1ed, and es-
pecially when It has become a souroe or InjustIce to the communl-
ty.fl._Pranc!. J. Haas, !In. and Soc&eltX, 2nd ed. (new York, 19$2), 
p. 257. 
uals. -lb. state 18 made for the Individual and not tn. individual 
tor the at8te."12 
In ~ock.'. opinion, civil society originates in a formal, 
volunt817 compact between equals to establish a community. 
Men being • • • b7 na tuz-e all tz-e., equal. and Inde. 
pendent, no one can be put out of this eatate and sub. 
Jected to the political power ot another without hia 
own conaent. The only wal by which &n1 one dlve.t. 
hi .. elt of hi. natural liberty and puts on the bonds ot 
civl1 .001ety 1s by agreeing with other men to join and 
unite into a oommunlty tor their oomtoz-table, sate, and 
peaoeable living one amongst another, in a seoure en-jarmont ot their propertle., and a greater .ecurity 
againat any tbat are not ot It.13 
Nor Is it sut.f'lclent to establlsh such a voluntaI7 covenant 
once whereby clvil aoclety exlsts botn for the orlginal constitu-
ents and tor future generations. Since the state of nature is 
that atate ?blch "all men are naturally in, tt14 tOl"!al voluntaro)" 
conaent la neo8.81l17 for every man re!tching "the age of dlscre-
tlon" to abandon the stat. of nature and embraoe clvil 8001ety_ 
Locke apeaks ot t01"lD8l. consent as the "on17 way" by wh1ch man can 
.nte~ olvil soo1et,..lS In •• where he S&r8, "a ch1ld 1a born a 8ub. 
ject of no countrr or gov.~t."16 
12Aaron, P. 286. S.e alao Jon •• , !astlrl 2! Pal1tlgal 
'lbS?\IgQt, p. 215. 
llc.o •• ch, 8, •• ct. 95, PP. 164-165. 
14Ib1d" ch. 2, .ect. 4, p. 118. 
lSIbld" ch. 8, aect. 99, p. 166. 
16Ib1d, •• 80t. 118, P. 177. 
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As TJoClt6 h1mnalf implies, 1:10St pGo;:;le did. not wholly- oono'fll' 
w1th him in this .-tte1'l of oonsent to goveztn.rrl$nt.11 They believed 
~at thaT we~e nat~117 oltizens ot the country in Which ths7 
:Wo," bol'n. altho1l$b there was some unoerta1nty about oltll1fma hom 
in fOHign lands. Locke ttlKes this llI01"Ct unusual 81 tua. tlon o£ 
birth in • to".!gn land (·Xf a subject of F..n~laM heve a child bJ 
an EDgllsbwoman tn Fl'tmoe, Whose subJeot 18 hG?tt18) 88 a t;ypleal 
exe..mp1e of tho nat~ 11ben,. whioh all !':len enjo1 tochoon th.lz.-
cOlmlOnwea.ltb lnatead of' being bound by the cholee of their rathea-. 
P1'Opel"'1. b.ow¥.~, •• %'V"a to keep aona withln the gov~$nt 
of 'helt' t'atherfa cbol"_ AU Pl'Opert7 wIthin the "a.ht 1s 8W>-
jeot to the due", Juv1.d:totlon of the gOVorr.nt, 'OMe the olt1-
aen. 'w1th tbe1l' po ••• saloll. have -toztmal17 ent.Hd clvll aoolety.19 
Ch11~n ot "ttl.ema, it th.,. wl.sh to lnhel!'lt the land of thei. 
fathel', must u" the pl'Ope~ 8ubjoot to the l .. w. of that; country. 
and alao eJIblta •• thell' rathert " cltl •• nahlp.20 Aliena living 
17ru.t." aeot. UT, P. 116. 
laaw.. aG.$_ US, ,. 111. 
19D1S... aeot. 120,. P. 1781 fta, the $&me Eu,t. tlleHtO.-., 
wbe:rebt UJ.1 one un! ttl. hle perton. which .~l$ betoX'G: t%"$.8. to 4U11' 
cOlt1l'1Onftalth, b)" the __ he unites Me pcuusefud.ona, wh1ch ON 
befope tNe, to it al.o, and tho,. bGoo_. both of thea, pGrson and 
poe.e.alon., .aubjeot to the govo~nt and dom1n1on of that ool'ltmOn-
wealth .. a long as It hath a belng.tf 
20W4t •• et. 111,. p. 176. tf ['1.' lb. eon oannet o:vdl~ly .'!)III 
30)" the poe.td.ona of llJ.$ tathep but under the same te~ his 1: .... 
tho" d1d, OJ' beeomng a ~r ot the aocle~lt wh$.rGtv he put. 
~=~ "pN8~tl)" und.$X" th. ZQvernment he t1l14a tho" estab-
I: 
i 
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within the state may enjoy the use of property aocording to the 
laws of the commonwealth. They are free, moreover, to leave ~e 
, 
state and live elsewhere, though "by donation, sale, or other-
wise," they must rid themselves of ownersh1p of land in the state 
which they are leaving.21 
Onoe formal oonsent is eiven to become a member ot a civil 
sooiety, the oitizen is bound to remain a subjeot of that sooiety 
until the government is dissolved, e.g., by foreign oonqueat or 
internal revolution: dWhereas he that has once, by aotual agree-
ment and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any 
commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and 
remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the 
11bert,y of the state of nature, unless by any calamity the govern-
ment he was under comes to be dissoived. n22 The right of revolu-
tion from an unjust government Locke allows to the majOrity.23 
Not everyone, however, living within the state is formally a 
citizen, though all within its boundaries, even over-night travel-
era, must obey its laws, giving a form of tacit consent: 
And to this I sal, that every man that bath any posses-
lion or enjoyment ot 8DJ part of the dominionl of &n7 
21Ib1d., sect. 21, p. 178. 
22lb1d , 
23~, oh. 19, .eot, 233, p. 236: "[T]h1s therefore ia the 
privilege-o? the people in general above what any private person 
hath I That particular men are allowed • • • to have no other reme. 
dy but patience, but the body ot the people may, with reapect, re-
aiat intolerable tyranny, • • ." 
government doth hereby give hls taoit oonsent, and is 
.s tar forth obliged to obedience to the law. of that 
government, durIng such enjoyment, a~ anyone under It, 
whether this hl. possesslon be of land to him and hIs 
heira torever, or a lodging only for a week; or wheth-
er it be barely traveling freely on the .highway; and 
in erfect, it reaches as far as the ve~ beingApf any 
one within the territories of that government.at. 
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Locke fa dootrine of consent to government 1s contusing be-
cause it was 80 much at varianoe with acoepted praotice and bellet 
In his own day, and also in more modern times. PerhaPs, as Gough. 
claims, this ve'1!1 incongruIty with contemporary praotice 1s a 
"striking teattmony to the seriousness ot Locke'. beliet in the 
prinoiple ot consent.n25 Yet, it taoit consent for Locke meant .a 
little as ~aical presence within .. oommunity, then the concept 
or formal voluntary consent to authori tJ in his philosophy becomes 
vague alao. Looke, however, 18 certainl,. correct in stating that 
no ~overnment has a right to exist, no ruler a rlf¢lt to govern, 
except with the consent of the oommunlty.26 
Rule by majority i8 the method adopted bY' Looke 1"01" the gov-
ernment ot olvll soo1ety:' 
POI', when any number" ot men ha vo, by the consent of 
every indlvidual, made a community, they have thereby made 
tha t communi t,. one body, with&- pow a... to aCIt as one body, 
which ls omf by the will and determination of the 
majori t l. For that wblch acta all7 oommunity, being onl,. 
Z4Ib1d •• on. 8, .eot. 119, p. 177. 
2SGough, p. 66. 
26Jones • pp. 17J.-175: nNo matter how long or how oompletel, 
one man aotually exero!ses power over others he 1s never moralll justified in doing 80 unless they oonsent to hie author1ty." 
the oonsent of tho individuals of it, and it being one 
body, must move one way, it is neoessa.ry that the body 
should move tha t way wh! thel' tIle grell tel' fOl'ce oaI'rios 
1 t, whioh Is the OOllSOllt of the majorl ty, or else 1 t 1s 
impossible it should not or oontinue one body. one oom-
munity, whioh the oonsent or every individual that unit-
ed into it agreed tl~t it should; and so every one is 
bound by that consent to be oonoluded by tho maJority.27 
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In England. by Locl;e t 8 timo, t.1-te principle of legislation by 
majority-deoision in Parlla~Gnt oaI"r1ed 80 much tradition with it 
that Loc!:e Hud others considered It D. "na.turaln procadu..,.28 
Locke qui ta l"easonably thcr"Gt"'or6 concluded that r:mJo:rlty-declsion 
WilD nocessar'lJ to save a oOml':'lunlty from complete oonfusion and ul-
ttmate dissolution. Though porhaps duo aore to fnulty wording 
~ anyth1ng else, this "moonanloal ooncopt1on" of society drawn 
up by Locke, wherein the greater tOl"oe must always provail, 18 
Justly ol"itlo1zed by later writers. A. Sabino points out, "Older 
theol"loa ot popular sovere1gnty. suoh ae Mar.l11o's, had oommonl1 
held that the 'prevailing part' o.f Ii oommuni ty may be welghted for 
quality as well as for quantlty."29 In other words, the t an1g&: 
1!1!1 ot the o0tll!1Un1 ty deservos to be 1nolucled in the a lor 111£1. 
tor the purpose ot determinIng legislation. In Lockets taeory, 
too much emphaal. i. plaoed on sheer numerical superIority. 
PI 
27 e,G" oh. 8t •• ot. 96, p .• 165. 
2850• Gough, p. 63. Gough el •• where suggests that Locke '. 
general alm 1n the, Treat! •• s was to juat!f7 exlsting gove1"l11'J1en' 
1nat!tut!on., among th .. maJ91'1ty-J.'lIUle. Se. Gough, PP. 71-12. 
Se. also ch. IV, P. 90, n. 44. 
29sablne, pp. 533-534. 
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Locke ha.d perhaps tttoo sanguine a belief' in the reasonable-
ness of mankind."30 Henoe he would never doubt that a numerical 
majority would likewise be a rational majority. seekin~ the common 
good of all and not their own interests. p.~ facto, however, nu-
merioal superiority is no guarantee of fair legislation in itself. 
but only when it is coupled with a rational consideration of the 
issues and a sympathy for the interests of all parties.)l 
In Locke's own theory. the dootrine of majority-rule shows a 
further development in his ooncept of personal consent. Men for-
mally entex- oi vil society only by their own consent. Art er,Yard s , 
however, their consent means not acceptance individually of each 
measure proposed, but oonsent to the will of the majority: "[A]nd 
80 every one is bound by that consent (to government] t,o be con-
cluded by the majority."32 Putendor!' also said that majority-
decls10ns are binding on the community, the reason being that one 
300ough, p. 92. Wl1~more Kendall disousse. this point at 
some length in "John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule," 
IllInOis StudIes !n!B! Social Science •• XXVI (194l), 134-13$. 
31WI1liam J. Kenealy S.J •• "The Legal Profession and Segre-
gation," Social Order VI [OaSe, IXl (Deoember 1956). 484: II [B)e-
cause the essence of liberty is the freedom to exeroise individual 
and equal personal rights and because voting majorities are a.ble 
and quick to vindicate their own rights, true and effective democ-
ra.cy must consist in minority ri~~ts under majority rule. But 
never in history has there been, and never in ~~e future can there 
be, minority rights under majority rule unless the majority repu--
diates the blasphemy that numbers make truth and that might ma.kes 
right; unless the majority has the intelligence and good-will to 
subordinate will to reason and to subjugate prejudice to judg-
ment." 
32~, ch. 8. seot. 96, p. 165. 
Part Two - Clv!l Propert,y 
Locke began his study ot property with a desoription or prim-
itive man in the state of nature, appropriating eaCh day what he 
needed from Ha tW'e '. vas t s torehouae. As an ind1 vidual consumer, 
and produoer trom the 80i1, ot Nature's good8, he owned enough 
land to produce the good8 needed for oPdinary sub.istence, but 
l1ttle more. Then with the chance introduction ot money, tirst as 
bri,,h t11 oolored • tones, and then as It standard medium ot: ex-
ohange, the economio system was revolutIonized. Material wealth 
became a goal to be aOhieved, a8 industrious men were able to ac-
quire a surplus of oonsumer goods and land-holdings beyond the 
power ot indvidual cultivation. Duzwable goods also, such a8 met-
ala, preoloua atonea, crude manufactures, were another Bource ot 
wealth whioh able men read11y aoqulred.J4 All thIs excesa wealth 
waa dul,. valIdated by the consent ot men. Eventually the problema 
connected with growth in population, scarcity ot land, and In-
or .... 1n mate!'!al wealth, neoe.8itated the oreat1on ot clv11 gOY. .j 
ernment to p~ea.~v. law and order.lS 
• 
.34 c,a" ch, S, aect. 48, p. 140. 
l>Ibld •• aect. 38, P. 135: "But as familles inoreased and in-
duatr'7 enlarged their ,tocks, thtdr poseesalona enlarged wIth the 
need ot the., • • • and then, by oon.ent, they came in time to set 
out the bound. ot thel~ distInct teprltorl •• , •• I" 
61 
62 
'rhe economio differences between civil society and the s ta te 
of nature as Locke first conceived it were considerable. Instead 
of a primi ti ve economy in w:~ch overy laborer su;::>plied all the ne-
cessities of l1fe for himself and his famIly, in civil society a 
marked division of labor had grown up. Peaceful trade and com-
meroe made it possible for men to specialize in their work, 8.S 
carpenters, shoeMakers, tool-makers, etc; contrarily, increased 
specialization increased f'urthor trade. 36 With the standardized 
money which the civil government supported, tradesmen sold their 
wares for a definite price, and later bought in the marketplace 
foodstuffs or the durable $':,oods of' other craftsmen. l'hus men came 
to realize that by this indirect method of securing the goods 
which they wantod for their own constlr.lption, they actually ob-
tailled more of those goods than if t..'"ley labored directly in the 
fields or over the forge for them. 
Marketplaces, as the centers of economic activity, rapidly 
expanded into towns and, where the location was apt, into oities. 
36Some pa~\llel exists betwe~n Locke's early oivil sooiety 
and various sta~es of medieval economy, especially in the northern 
part of Westo~n ~urope. Edie comments thus on the interaction of 
specialization and trade: t1(MJen we.re beginning in large numbers 
to produce thin~s not for the~.r own consumption, but for the con-
sumption of others. frhen, of course, came exchange, and greatly 
increased trade."--(gdIe, Eoonomics, Principles !!.US. Problems, p. 
43). N.B.: In the followin~ footnotes we will continue to exem-
plify our theory BS to the effects of money on oivil society by 
references to actual occurrences in medieval economic development. 
In this way, we will gradually prOsf;nt a picture of the background 
and current economic statuB of ~estorn Surope, and especIally hug-
land, in the seventeenth century when Locke was writin~~ his theory 
of property. 
Yet town 11te was dependent upon the hinterland about it tor rood-
stutfs, and alao raw materials, e.g., akins, metals, timber, etc., 
for the developaent ot town building and manufaoturing. Henoe 
there was much tI'avel between town and country weekly, even dai-
ly.37 To make traveling easier and to get perishables to market 
taster, publio roads woro buIlt, and bridges erected to span wa-
terways. Evon befara the advent of sate roads, oaravans ot mer-
ohants pushed .t'urther into the oount1"7 area and made business con-
taots with other towns and trading oenters.38 Vessels weN con-
st~cted to US8 ~~e rIvers, lakes, and aeaa aa additional media of 
oommunioation between localities. Thus local commerce gradually 
expanded into regional, national. even international tradIng.39 
J7~,f.1V1n M. Knight, Egono~Q HI,tga; 2t kORt l.2 lb!t l&l.2t. 
.iW! !tJ.4dl,' As'. (N •• York, 192, p. 20S. Alao Edi8, PP. 43-44. 
36Melvln Knight, pp. 203-204. 
39g • L1i8on comments on the extent ot English medIeval com-
meroe thua: The medieval trade routes ran in four direotioo •• 
ane led to Calais. Another oonneoted this country with t.lle Neth-
erlanda (Plandera, Holland, etc.) whoe. markets served a vast hin-
terland stretohlng to the shore. or the Mediterranean. The th1rd 
pro v1 ded the link with northern Europe (Scand!navia and Prussia) 
and roached as tar as Iceland. !he fourth was the direct sea pa.s-
sap;e to southern Europe (Gascony and Italy). 
!he oommodities whioh were handled in foreign trade cove~d 
an extenaive range. The _in importt was wine furnished by {lasoo-
1'qj other Frenoh imports Inoludod woad foll' dyeing. salt and atone. 
~e Netherlands sent herrings, linen cloth, and tPlandera tIl •• ,' 
while Spain supplied woel. 011, leather, and iron. The Hansard. 
brought oom, shipbuilding matoriala (timber, pitch, and tar), 
wax, gold, and pepper; and the great galle78 ot Venice and FlOl"-
enoe .ere 'well ladonad with thing. ot oomplaoence'--coatly aplces 
tram tbe east, •• ,et wlnea and extravagant 'trifles.'-•• B. Lip-
.on. ll!!. Gl!9!3?h .at &l&llah Sgg,-,t:y; (B •• York, 19$0), p. 65. 
A constantly gr-ollinr" variety ot goods became availablo. The 
neCeasities of lIfe were commonplaoe items, as town$men and far-
mers alike olamored for hiWl quality tools, and other utilities. 
Coatly luxurie8 too, spices, per!~tmes, expensIve clothing, etc., 
.ere 1n demand.40 Pres.ed ~J competition from outside manuractur-
ers, local oraftsmen copied the goods which oommerce brought In, 
soon d1800vering t}~t they could make many ot them better and more 
cneaply. Aa the volume of goods became larger and more varied, 
and the manufaoturing teclUllquea more elaborate, further speciali-
zation within the oratt. took place. Por example, one oraftsman 
ooncentrated on one of many different kinds ot woolen cloth, or 
handled only one of aeveral dlatlnct operations, such a8 spinning, 
w.aving, or dye1ng.41 !hua domestic produotion of durable goode 
moved into public shops and became manufaoturing, striotly so-
called. 
Better farm implements, together wlth new, more efficlent 
methods of agrioulture, ~leased from basic occupations numbers of 
able-bodied men who made their way into the city seeking OOCUpa-
tlon. Employed by c~artamen or merChants, they received for their 
40 rn Northern Europe during the thirteenth oentury, great In... 'I 
Mrna.tiODa.l tall' • •• 1'. held, .specially in the p~oY1nc. ot Cbus- I' 
pagne. 1'0 the.. tairs came merchants ot -111 na tlon. with a tre-IIII 
.endou. VlU'iety ot goods to aatl.r, the des1re. at the novelt,.- 1,11'1 
and luxur,r-hung.,. provincials. See Melvin Knight, p. 201. Lipaon II 
not.s that Engliab tail'. .ere common enough, but oon.lderably le •• 
lavish tban thoee on the Continent. Bote, howev.r, the impre •• ive 
11.t ot imports given in n. 39 above. 
41.elYin Knight, p,. 219-220. 
personal labor now, not land or conaumer goods, but fixed wagea 
which were redeemable ror the nec6ssities and some of the conven-
iences of life. Thus many men in civil sooiety came to own little 
more than their capacity to work for another, though the industri-
ous wage labore~ could also acquire land or other real property 
through careful saving. 
Money, as the life's blood of the economic system, was needed 
in greater quantity to keep pace with the increased !'low ot busi .. 
nesa. Men mined the earth for precious metals which were later 
minted into ooins.42 Paper money appeared, first as private prom-
issory notes or bills or oredit, later as government paper money 
or note. wtGh government approval.43 New torma of property owner-
ship evolved from the changing economic situation. In the field 
of manuractUl'Jing, men sought to own and control not la.nd, but the 
42Lipson describes the impetus Whioh Ne. World precious met-
als gave to English economy in the age of Elizabeth: "The influx 
of precious metals from the Ne. World served to promote the growth 
of a class of entrepreneurs, partly because it made the national 
wealth more liquid, and partly because the ~18e in prices swelled 
profits, and so encouraged investments in industrial and commer-
cial ente~rises." (Lipson, p. 84) 
4JKnight notes that great medieval Italian banking houses, 
e.g., the Ricciardi and Scali, had branches throughout Western Eu-
rope and Asia Minor, including one in London. They advanc~d enor-
moua sums to kings, emperors, and popes, and helped to organize 
the finances ot en tit'e na ti ons • Roughly frO'll 1200 to 1500 their 
influence was very great throughout Europe. Later, aa Lipson com-
menta, English king. t'elied upon nat1ve goldsmiths, who had became 
the nation'. leadIng bankers and money-lenders, tor government 
loans. In 169h, six years after the publication of the Second 
Treatise, the Bank of ingland was founded and began to.issue off1-
eial government bank notes. (S.e Melvin Knight, p. 12b; also Lip-
son, PP. 86.87.) 
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tools of production or the raw l:~aterials for l"'>1anufactur~d prod-
ucts. ~~here ono man's capi tal was insufficient, partnerships were 
established; profits wet"e determinod accord1ng to legal contract, 
and not the work-hours or personal labol' of the individual. A neVi 
economic order tool, shape, in which the control of' industry shift-
ed from independent craftsmen workin~ sirl,':;ly or in groups to capi-
talist omployers who stood outside the ranks of ma.nual labor.44 
The formation of the corporation, or joint-stock company, estab-
lished a new form of property ovmershlp. Stock- und bond-holders 
did not add personal labor to their propel·ty or even exercise re-
sponsibility over it. 7hey simply contributed money to an econom-
ic enterprise, in return for which they recoived a fixed rate of 
interest or a proportionate share of the profits.45 
All these eoonomic dovelopmen ts s torn logically from IJocka' s 
labor-use theory of property as modifiod by the use of money. 
Contingent factors, such as growth in population, geor,raphical 10-
cation, naturaal resources, technological improvements in work and 
44See Lipson, pp. (31 ... 82, for an account of the economio fac-
tors frOM whioh evolved a capitalist society in seventeenth cen-
tury England. See nlso H. H. Tawney, Relirrion and tho Hise of 
Capi tullsm .. 2nd ed. (London, 1936), pp. 13~-137:-- - - -
45Llpson, p. 88: !lIndustry was financed not only by indepen-
dent entrepreneur's utilizIng their own or borrowed cap! t1:'l.l, but 
also by joint-stock companies And paptners~lips. Ji'rom the nix-
teenth century onwards thElse instItutions furnished an important 
source of capital, since they enabled a conce:rn whoso nature or 
size demanded large sums to dnrive support from a circle of inves-
tors." He concludes: "Hence the modern methods of financing in-
dustry were being widely practiced as early as the seventeenth 
century" in England. (Ibid t ) 
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t~vel. etc •• f1gu~d 1n th1s economic growth also. Yet theae ad-
vances t"I-om the state of natw:-e to organized o1vil society .e1". 
eaal1y predictable, and de taqts had occurred 1n Western Europe 
and England berore 1688. Locke therefore 1n composing hls chapter 
on property law 1n operat1on around hlm an economlc system quite 
•• advanoed a. that described above. 
In v1e. ot the.e evident dlfterencea bet.een atate of nature 
and modern economics •• e mle~t •• 11 expeot Locke to have 1otro-
duoed aom. radioal ohangea 1n hi. propex-tJ theol"J for 01 vil soole-
ty. Yet none are expr ••• ly made belond granting men tn a8sembl, 
tbe power to tis property laws acco~lng to 0lrcumatanoes.46 Evi-
dently then Locke expeotect that hl. orlg1nal px-lnclpl.. of proper-
ty'-ownez-ahlp oould be ma1nta1ned aa such wIthout 108S ot va11dl ty 
111 clv11 aoclet7. In the followlng pages Lockets a •• 'l.Dlptlon hette 
will be t •• ted to prove 1ta worth. 
ane obvious d.tect 1ft Locke'a propett~ theo~ tor olvll 80cl-
et7 la the abaenoe ot all tl tl.s beyond those ot personal labor on 
unclaimed land, and the rlght ot oh1ldren to Inherl tance of" pro-
pert7 tram the1r papents.47 Firat ot all then Locke should have 
46'1,.$1 •• ch. $, aeot. 45. p. 1)8a "[lJn some parts at the 
world. where the Increase ot people and stock, wlth the use ot 
mone,., bad .ade land .oaroe, and .0 ot some value, the .everal 
o01'llllUn1sle ••• ttled the bounds ot their dlstinct tewltorl •• , and, 
b7 law8 wltnln themselve., regulated tbe pttopertl •• ot the prlvat. 
men ot thel1" aociety, and ao, by compaot and agz-eement, .ettled 
tn. propers,. whlch labor and InduatP,y began," 
47Plrlt !£eatta. Rt GoVtremenl. ch. 9, •• ot. 88, p. 62, 
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notod that h1s lnltlal concept of personal labor Included ~e 
o~lglnal title ot tl~8t occupation a5 well as ot productive 1a-. 
bor.48 Thus the natural basis for the varioua legal tl ties to 
property ownership would havo been 8 t~engthon&d by the add! tlon ot 
a second natural tltle to original ownership, besIdes "the work ot 
one's hands." Likewls. turther derivative tltle. to property, 
other than ramily 1nher1tanoe, would be needed to~ organIzed 8001-
ety, .apeolally the various tItl •• ar1sing trom contractual agree-
ments: buying and sellIng, renta, loans at Interest.49 Wage laboza 
In particular, a ve~ common contraotual title to property In clv-
11 society, should have been noted by Locke and carefully di.tln-
guished from personal produotive labor on property not owned by 
another. Productlvo labor la a valId title to the th1nS produced 
only if It 18 exercIsed in oneta own name, and on land or raw ma-
terials which are onets own. flage labor, on the other hand, by 
whioh one gIves up the fruit of onets labor tor a speci~led com-
pensation, though productive In the proces8, 18 not a tItle to 
ownership of' the thIng produoed, since it 18 done in the name ot 
another, and frequently with hi. raw materials and tools.SO 
480tt sup •• ch, II, P. 41. 
49~ n. 70 for the distinction between original and de-
rived t~to propertJ. 
$°Lookftts phrase, "the turr. my servant has cut,ft to judge 
from the oontext, 1s probably not a formal aclmowledgment of wage 
or slave labor in tn. state ot nature, and oertainly not a defi-
nite treatment ot ~e same ae title to property. See C,O., ob. S, 
seot, 27, p. 130. 
Otberkinda or Boolal labor exIsted also, for which I~ooke 
talled to aocount. In the complex eoonomio system of seventeen~ 
century England, many people contributed their labor to the maklng 
of a alngle product, e.g., a loaf ot brend, 
For it 18 not merely the ploughman's pains, the rea-
per'a and ~oaherta toil, and the baker's sweat, is 
to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour or 
thoae who broke the oxen, who d1gged llnd Wttought the 
.Iron and stonea, who felled and tramed the timber em-
plo1ed about the plmlgh, mill, oven, or any other uten-
al1s, which are a vast numher, requisIte to thIs corn, 
tram lta sowlng to lts being made bread, MUst all be 
charged to the .ccount of labor. and received as an 
effect ot that.!>:!. 
Sinco Looke hlmself gives this example ot group labor, it 1s 
strange that he oftered no expl~latlon ot how rIval claims to 
ownership could be adJustod to biB theory ot prtopertty throuY):1 la-
bor. Again, using the same example ot the loaf of bread, what 
share did the merchant who financed the bread-making operation 
ha ve In the prof! ta trom the sale of a loaf? Or what was the 
share to be giVen the labor boss In the grain field or iron mine, 
Ort the captain ot the t~aaing veasel that brought the wbeat Ort 
other CODftodl tie. needed by the workmenJ or finally wha t was the 
share or tn. Master-baker whoae genius was responsible tor the 
qualitJ of the loaf? Three taotors enter tnto the production of 
$1 e·a •. , ch. 5, sect. 43, PP. 137-138. Se. alao Jues Bonar, 
~11Q1gphX ~ EolltlQal IqQPgax, 3rd od. (London, 1921), p. 102, 
[Tlhe labou~ ••• owe. its erficlency to the social surroundlngs 
of the workman, and to tne dIvision or labour, and inventIons, 
wi thout whioh he a. an !ndi vidual would Nall.e a ve't"1 interior-
product indeed." Larkin not •• that the produot of labour depends 
upon marketing conditiona, tinancial elementa, etc. Larkin, p.67. 
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&n7 ca.mepoiallaed product. capital, manag.~nt or braine, and la-
bor.S2 All tbre. d •• erve their proportionate 8ha~ 1n tne protits 
tJtom the manutaotttrJed goo4,., but Looke cUd not determine how troi. 
div1s10n mIght be etrected. 
Finall,. Looke dId not qU8.t.lon the w.l1dl ~ of hi. prinoiples 
tor intangible propertY'. e.g., bonda, 8too.k., intere.t loans, etc. 
Granted that the IndJ.vldual "worke" to .e. that hi. mone1 1. pzto-
PeP17 inv •• te4J afterwards, the inv .... nt 1n another". oue labor. 
to bring .... lth to 1t,. tir.t owner. Aga1n, po ••••• lon, of intangi-
bl. proper'''. In Locke'. 4a1 and at ~. pre.ent t1me, otten car-
ri •• w11i1h 1t limited rishts to oontrol one'. proPel"'. A ahare ot 
stock la not 80 much a t1tl. to ownerah1p ... a contingent 01a1m to 
camp&QJ protits.S3 Dwen ~ough .uoh new torma of propertY' are 1e-
&1 tl __ , the,. cannot be jus titled .s tt the work, or Olle t s hand •• -A 
Look.'s IndividualIstic eoonODl1os w .. " Beta derensible tOI' tIle 
state ot nat~. but the .tatus ot 80.0nOl!ll10 pl'o6l'eas in •• ven-
teenth oentUl"J England had al,.. .. d1 pt-Oved that the the017 aa it 
_'004 was inadequate ror- tho tull flowering ot h\.l1lAl1 potentiali-
ti •• in 60J1Jlel"Oe and 1114\18t17_ 
52 PO" Plus Xla=r!~ ~ (FOi" Yoar! A,ter), •• ot. 69. appen41x '0 RIO~L=t: '!Ji!SooI&\ Bcons etc., p. 419. 
S3Hev.; John F. Oremin, Catho].1! Bog! .. l'l'19ol,l!. (Milwauk •• , 
19>0), P. 481. 
S4ae.,_ JQlm P. Cron1n,BconomlcI and. loo.le!l (ll •• York, 
1939), P. Oil. b. Ol'Oll1n.~ 01 oorporatIons in model'll tim.s 
rev18ing prop •• ',. con.eptlona. but hi8 arguments are ~ tortlori 
va1ld witbrat •• enoe to Lookean property oon •• pt •• 
.f 
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The most serious defect in Looke's property theory for civil 
society, however, was his failure to emphasize the social obliga-
tions of property ownership. Property limitations for the state 
of nature, e.g., wastage, the "enOUgh and as good left in common" 
proviao, etc., .ere eitner invalidated by tne eoonomic cond1tions 
of oivil sooiety or not brought up-to-date. In the follOwing pa-
ges, we will briefly show the ineptness ot three Lockean social 
principle a for oivil property, and then point out how Looke oould 
have revised or ohanged these principles to fit seventeenth cen-
tury property arrangementa. 
By way of introduction, Looke'a atatement that the wide use 
of money tended to produce property inequalities is not reprehen-
sible, since it represents an historical fact.55 Bor did he err 
in his declaration that men have consented to property inequality 
since that too is fact. Consent merely means that different men 
obviously exhibIt different degrees of ability and industry in the 
acquiaition and use of their property. Granted these payahologi-
55 ~ 4 G ch. S, sect. 9, p. 1 o. See also Bede Jarett O.P., 
Soclal ~1e. of the K1d1. ~ •• (W •• tm1n1.te~. Md •• 1942i. pp. 
ilil-1421 He no'Ee.\hi"'"el'lect 0 money on the medieval econon17 
thua 1 "Mone,.. was beginning to take the place of land as the symbol 
of power, and with money came, curiously, the sense of absolute 
ownerahip. Men, whether a town or a noble or a villein, bought 
their fre.dom, and wi th f'reedom naturally condi tional ownership 
ceaaed, and with the lapaing of condItional ownership abaolute 
ownership emerged. With absolute ownerahip came the de8ire to in-
crease peraonal holdIngs of land, and tb1s desire dominated the 
evolution of polItical hiatorT, etc •••• " Conditional ownership 
was characteriatic of the older feudal 8,..8tem of land tenure. He 
conclude8, "It was moneT then that altered the attitude of the me-
dieval mind to property." (Ibid,) 
12 
oal law8 or economics, 1hIch operate to produce wealth for a t_. 
Locke's job waa to establish norms for the use of that wealth in 
conformity with private advantage and public welfare.56 
Locke's IntrodUctory princIple, that "God gave the world to 
Adam and his poa ter! ty in common, '* oan be rephrased thus: everr 
man haa the natural rIght to a surti.ciency or Nature's goods tor 
himself and hia 4ependents .S1 In the state of nature a man could 
satiety his needa by peraonal labor on his own land. It, however, 
in oi viI society wage labor ia !Rare oommon among workers, the same 
principle would require that wagea be proportioned to the needs ot 
the wOPkero and his tamily. '!he basio eaming-power ot the wor-
ker's labor 1. conatant bo~ in the atate ot nature and in civil 
sooiety, since it il tn. ord1narr meana tor a man under any cir-
oumatance. to attain m04erate comfort and prosperity in this lite. 
On the other hand, it hi. wages do not match hi. needa, then the 
worker and hi. family do not participate fully 1n God'. grant ot 
the world to all men.58 
S6CatholicSoclal Prinoiples, p. 5.3: It[!lhere Is .. real senae 
in which morai law takes preoedenoe over economic or physical 
laws. While we cannot Ignore genuIne laws In the economIc field, w. orten can alter circumatances and condltiona, so that, under 
the aame law •• dlfterent reault. will ensue. n 
51In support ot the fIrat-named prinoiple, Locke saya: "[Ilen 
being onoe born, bave a right to thelr pre.ervation, and conse-
quently to meat and drink, an4suchother thIngs·as Nature aft9rds 
tor theIr subs1stenoe, ••• "--~, ch. 5, .eot. 24, p. 129. 
58a.rum .ov~ •• eo'. 24, p. )86. Leo notea that labor 1a . 
not only p.rsona and thua negotIable at a given prioe, but neoea-
sary to pre.erve the workman and his dependents. 
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PurthemoH, In the atat. or nature, Locke conditioned Indi. 
vidual aoquiai'ion ot land and goods by the olause tbat there be 
"enough and aa good lett In oommon tOI' othel'a.-S9 In 01vl1 .001 .... 
t" bowevol', all us.bl.land la already 01.1med by prlvat. ownera. 
Henoe the proviso Is usel ... unl •• a 1,. bo tN.n8tormed into a JIOIIIe 
oon-..rpOl'lU"J aoolal pJ:tinolple, e.g., tba t no one ahould 4.libel'"-
.'.17 u •• hi. propertf. even wltb1n tne bound. ot oommutatlve jue-
tt •• , 80 aa to injure the baatc l'1gb.ta and needa ot othe". Exam-
ple. or .uGh legal lnjuaU.o ape wage contraots In which the 
1'1ght. of the Bakel' pal'. ape aaoP1tloed tOI' the aake at .terial 
galn, or the ellaotllent of mon.y....-.1cing cO%'pOl'atlOll polielea which 
Indlreotl,. oause grave ham '0 Indl"lduala and 8omet!mes the en-
t1re oommwd ty. 60 Undo!' Lock.an theo!WJ, the pr ••• I'Y. tlon ot Indi-
vidual J)POperty 1. the du,," at the atato.61 Yet the state 1. 
bound to aateguard only ~e oommltment. ot cOM8Utatlv8 juatice, 
alnee o~er prlnolplea ot .oclal juat! •• and oharl t1 W8l'e not aet 
forth ·b, Locke. 62 
Pinall,-. though the na'-al limitation at ".,astage" ot go04s 
~92a!L. Ch. S, aeot. 26, P. 130, a •• ta. 32-33, PP. 132-133. 
~-= - ~a:t p. 61. S .. &1ao ~1ao A!I1i • •• 0'. 1a J:dm.lI.,= .ihI. SOI&" leono., P. . • 
6lc .. ~ •• oh. 1, •• ot. 1. ,. U8, ch. 9, .eet. 124, p. 180. 
62cOOlc up •• t'Poa Locke'. th80J71 .. (A)n:r le.l ."Item ot 
pJ)'Opeptr ...... hlp whiGh 4 ... Dot deny men an adequate pe •• l'd tor 
~.1. lebo. &b4 go04. auttiolent to meet thel~ need • .., be ~U8tl­
tied, though this ottel's no mea SUI'. elthel' of labor 01' need. --
Oook, P. lCDt. 
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or lands was obviously invalidated by the Intr~luctlon or monoy as 
"some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling," perhaps 
it alao could be modltled tor use in organised soclety.63 The law 
of wa.tage aought to pttevent a supernulty at goods In one man t • 
posseaaion, which would 81 the%- spoil or, being kept without pur-
pose, prove uaeless to owner and neIghbors allko.64 In olvI1 80-
olet,., the principle ot wastage could govern the use ot exoeS8 
wealth. Boar41ng of money or lulurloua living beyond the dictatea 
ot proprlet7 could be termed a waatetul use ot wealth. Wealthy 
men then would be prescribed to uae their exce88 money for pur-
po.e. botb personal11 and aoclally u.etul.6S 
These and othel" noma could have been formulated by Locke 
through tn. revlslon at prlnolples laid down in hia chapter on 
propel'tJ. Slnco be oontined, however, hi. application at aoolal 
princlpl •• to the prim1tive state ot nature, he neoeasarl1y shltt-
ed the responsIbility of regulatIng civil property tor the common 
63 4 c,O" ch. 5. aeot. 7, p. 1)9. 
64Ib&s! •• 8eot, )0, P. 131: sect •• )7, 38, PP. 134-136. 
6SLooke himself gives foundatIon for this demand that the 
w.alth1 use theIr exo ••• p08s8aaiona fo.r aoolally useful purposes. 
"[Ilt the fru1ts rotted or the venison putrefied before he oould 
.pend 1t, he ottended agalnat the oommon law at Natura, and w.a 
liable to b. puniahod: he invaded hi. neighbor's ahare, for he had 
no right f'&1"'ther than h1. usa oallad tor &n7 of them, and they 
might .eJlve to afford him convenienoe. at 11te." (,2.&. oh. 5, 
•• ot, 37, tif:p• 1)4-1lS). Further specifioatlon 01" us, and oqQvlD-
'rae, 01" 1" would be naoess&l"1 to count this an e featlve 80-
o prInolp ., 
7$ 
good to the legislative assembly of the civil governrnent.66 In 
the common int~rest tnerefore, the state legislature ~y further 
apecit'y ind1vidual property arrangements, but within these bounds. 
the laws that are established should be for all alike and in &0-
cordance with ~~e universal law of nature) 8econdly, no man anall 
have all or ar~ part ot his proporty taken away trom him without 
his oonsent, or at least the consent of the majority through their 
duly eleoted repre •• nta'lvel or by their own actlon •• 67 Largely 
beoause of inherent dlrrlcultl.s conneoted with Locke's oonceptlon 
of the law or nature and majority-rule, he exposed civil sooiety 
to two dangers through legislative notion. First an a£~embly or 
large property owners would be reluctant to pass legislation 
against the interest. of Its own members.68 Henoe suoh a majorlt,y 
m1ght conclude tlla tit was acoording to reason or the 1.ll'lWrl tten 
law of na tw-e tha t property in teres ts be allowed to operate unhin-
dered by governmental actlon, except in oase8 where commutative 
justice was violated. On tne other hand, a radical ass~bly ot 
66Ib1d., SBot. l8, p. 135; soct. 45, p. 138; ch. 11, sect. 
ll4, P. i83. 
67Ibid" oh. 11, sect •• 134-142, pp. 18)-190. 
68wl111am Y. Elliott and Nell A. McDonald, Western PolItical 
Herltage (new York, 1949), PP. 545-546: "!he majority slmply w*l~ 
not take away property r1ght., Locke thinks, because the majorlt,y 
Is oomposed ot indIv1duals who are all concerned w1th the protec-
tIon ot property rights--a convenient theo17 and not a.n unreason-
able one 180 long as the electorate 1n England was 11mi ted to pro-
perty holders and dominated by the squlrearchy ot t he seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries." 
non-property owners might consldet· it nore in acco.rdance with rea-
son to restrict t.ne exercise of property ri(",hts by multifarious 
gov~rnment regulations. 69 
A truly rational, unbiased body of men could work out a se-
ries of proporty re~~lations equitable for all, but Locke would 
have acted moro prudently ,if he had provided concrete principles 
of social justice, derived from the law of nature, by which the 
legislators mifrpt determine th.eir property measures. Why he did 
not do so, and some of the consequoncos of his failure in this re-
spect, will be indicated in the next chapter. 
69Governmontal regulation to the point of Socialism or gov-
ernment ownership of property would seem to be forestalled by 
Locke's statement: "For the preservation of property being the end 
of govern.!l1ont, and that for v/hich men enter into society, it nec-
essarily supposes and requiro& that the people should have proper-
ty, wi thou t which they mus t bo supposed to lose the. t by entering 
into civil society wllich was the end for which they entered into 
it. "--.£.&.2.,., ch. 11, sect. 138, p. 187. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. Lockean and Papal i'heoI7 
TWo centuries atter the publicatIon ot the !WO treatise, ~ 
eiv,' Ggv'EDment, Pope Leo XIII, on May 15, 1891, published an en-
oyc11cal on the social questIon, i.e., the rights and duties ot 
rich and poor, capital and labor, with1n organized society. Ti-
tled Re:rwa lovarum (.9.Q Ji!1!. Oondition .2t. Lab2£), the enoyolical 
treated at length the origin, nature, and proper u.e of private 
property.1 Same people have protesaed to find a a1m11arity 1n the 
wq in wh1ch Locke and Pope Leo XIII set out to jua'it;y the right 
ot private proper.,. The similar1ty 1. undoubtedly there, and it 
w111 b. interestIng to note how tar-this s1m11arIt,y goe., and at 
the same tIme u.etul to .ee how Leo XIII (along with his successor 
Pope Pius XI) reconcl1.s thIs basically private right ot property 
w1 til the demands of the common good. 
Three reasons are gIven by Leo why ownership of property is 
natural to man a. an IndIvidual. F1rst, man as a creature with 
reason and tree wl11, 1 ••• , a8 a moral being, should possess the 
lOt. Rerum lova~um, .ecta. 3-8 pp. 367-)70. Alao Quadra-
s.simo &'!!:!2. .ects. '-52, pp. 412=415. 
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right of ownership which is ~~o moral power to dispose freely ot 
material things aa his own. Secondly, mants rational nature urges 
him to provide for tuture contingenoies aa well as present enjoy-
ment. Thirdly, whIle material things are clearly ordained for the 
uae ot man, and man in turn requires them tor his preservatIon and 
pertection, h. must trequently labor over them to make them suit-
able tor his own use. Tbis labor, aa the impress ot human person-
ality on material oreation, so unites the material good with the 
laborer aa to make it part of himself and therefore his property 
by natural right. 2 
Locke's argument for property as a natural right was twofold. 
Property was justified first of all as necessary to satisfy man's 
needs, and secondly, as the proper expression of human personality 
man's personal freedom to dispose of himself and his effects as he 
thinks best.) Looke and Leo XIII are united in maintaining that 
productive labor as the expression of human personality is an ade-
quate title to ownersh1p of material goods, a bridge between the 
individual man and thia or that particular good.4 Furthermore, 
Locke'a contention that God-given reason in man prompt. him to ap-
2¥rum Nova£U!D, sects. 5-7, pp. 368-36<). 
)0,0,. ch. 5, secta. 25-26, pp. 129-130. See also oh. II, 
P. 40. 
4Locke ia le •• careful than Leo in distinguishing Droductive 
labo£ tFom the more general persgnal la09£. See Rerum ovarum, 
seot. 8, p. 370: "For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with 
toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild befope, 
it 1s now t~u1ttulJ ••• " 
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propriate things as his own from Nature's storehouse unites him 
with the first Leonine argument, that based on the rational nature 
of man.5 Again, when Locke develops his argument for the owner-
ship of land as well as consumer goods, he anticipates the Leonine 
position that man should provide for the future by possession of 
the earth itself as well as its fruits. 6 
In addition, Locke and Leo agree that no limits exist for the 
acquisition of property beyond "man's own industzay and the laws of 
individual peoples.,,7 Unlike Locke, however, Leo did not postu-
late for laboza or human industzay a further lim1tat1on of wastage, 
which later was to be ciroumvented by the use of money. His basic 
nozam for all degrees of economic progress was that tf ['r]he earth, 
though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minis-
ter to the needs of a1l.,,8 In addition, in his treatment of money 
and material wealth, he shows a far greater understanding of the 
social obligations of property than does Locke. Leo carefully 
5 ~, ch. 5. sect. 25, p. 129. 
6 Ibid., sect. 31, p. 132; RerHe Novarum, sect. 0, pp. 368-
7 6·8 . Rerum Novarum, sect. ,pp. 36 -3b9. Also~, ch. 5, 
•• ct. 45, p. 138: "[T]he soveral communities settled the hound. of 
their distinct territories, and, by laws, within themselves, regu-
lated the properties ot the privata men of their society, and so. 
by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and 
industry began." B.S.: Neither authoza denies the possibility ot 
extrinsic property limitation, but both agree that this regulation 
is a matter tor positive or civil law, not natural law. 
a Rerum Novarum, sact. 7, p. 369. 
r 
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distinguished between the natural r1ght of ownership and its pro-
per use. The f1rst is necessarily exclus1ve of all beside the in 
dividual owner, or it oeases to be a right of private property. 
The use, however, of material goods should be oammon. He quotes 
St. Thomas Aquinas: "Man should not consider his outward posses-
sions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them with-
out dIfficulty when others are in need. ft9 No one is requi:t-ed to 
give to others what he and his dependents need for self. 
preservation, or even for moderate comfort, in keeping with thei:t-
soolal position; but all men have a duty founded on Christian 
charity to give superfluous wealth to the indigent. Leo con-
cludes w~th the general social principle: "Whoever has received 
from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they b 
external and corporal, or gifts of the mind, has'received them fo 
the purpose of using them for perfeoting his own nature, and, at 
the aame time, that he may employ them, as t..11.e minis ter of God· s 
Providence, for the benefit of others •• flO 
Locke was silent on th~ duties of ownership after once af-
firming the wastage l1mitation, and adding the proviso that there 
should always be enough and as good left 1n common for others.11 
9Rerum Novarum, sect. 19. p. 316. Quotat1on rrom Summa Theo 
10glae, IIa-Ilae, q. 66, art. 2 0: Op.ra Omnia, III. 247:248,----
10Ib1d, 
11~, eh. 5, sect. 26, p. 130; sect. 30, p. 1311 sect. 32, 
p. 132 .. 
r 
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Moreover, by his own admission, the use of money circl~vented the 
wastage clause and brought on such a fever for additional land 
that the other proviso was made ineffective also. 12 nlUS material 
wealth, though not explicitly proposed by Locke as an end in it-
self, easily became such in lieu of a higher goal. 13 
Here perhaps is the most fundamental difference between Locke 
and Leo on the property question. Leo saw property, in fact, the 
entire economic order, as a rf1eans ordained to higher spiri tual 
ends. Men must first realize that they are creatures of a common 
Maker, God Himself; that they are directed to Him as their common 
end; and that they all have been redeemed by Jesus Christ and 
raised to the dignity of children of Go~ and heirs of heaven.14 
In this hierarchy of values, the gifts of nature, including mate-
rial wealth, are seen as temporal supports to be used by all in 
the attainment of their co~~on end. Leo's doctrine on prope~ty is 
superior to Locke's Views, precisely because he sets material 
wealth within a greater hiterarchy of values. When wealth is con-
sidered as an end desirable in itself, it sharpens the acquisitive 
12 4 4 Ibid., sect. '5, p. 139; sect. 51, p. 1 1. 
13Herbert Johnson, "Some He:r.:tarks about Locke's Teachings on 
Property," new Scholasticism, XXIV (April 1950), 150: "And since 
money does not spoil with time, there is no limit to the amount 
that any man may jus tly heap up for himself. ",{eal th is no longer 
a 1"1eanS, for a means is lim! ted by the end to which it is direc-
ted, as medicine to health; it has become an end, to be pm"sued 
without limit :ror its own sake." 
14Rerum Novarum, sect. 21, p. 377; sect. 32, p. 384. 
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instincts of men so greatly that they become oblivious of the 
r1ghts and needs of others in the same line of economic se1f-
sufficiency. This ant1-social attitude often prodUces ereat pro-
perty 1nequalities among men, and consequent unpest and hostility 
between rich and poor. lS 
Fope Pius XI, in his encyclical Quadragesimo ~ (Forty 
Year! After), published in May, 1931, confirmed and furthered many 
of the doctrines advanced by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum. Pi~s de-
clares t..'1at apart f'rom revelation, "reason eleaI'11 deduces from 
the nature of things and from the Individual and socla1 character 
of man, what is the end and object of the whole economic order as-
signed by God the Creator.n16 He adds that with proper subordina-
tion of values, "particular economic aims whether of soclety as a 
body or of individuals will be intimately linked with the univer-
sal teleological order," with the consequence that men will be led 
through economic activity to their f1nal end, God Himself, "our 
highe.t and lasting 000d."17 Furthermore, he notes that the right 
working of the economic order itself' is upset by unrestrained free 
l5~, sects. 1-2, pp. 366-367; guadrasesim2 Ane2, sects. 
3-5, PP. 4()1~02. See Charles p. Bruehl, The Fope's Plan tor So-
cial Reconstruction (New York, 1939), p. lI3i "Sane economICS will 
insist on the human and personal character of industry, tor when 
tnis factor is left out o~ consideration production loses all 
meaning and is deprIved ot every principle of regulatIon." 
16guadraSeaimo Anno, sect. 43, p. 412. 
17 I.~ 4 Ibid., sect. ~,p. 12. 
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competition in search of material wealth. Over-production of 
goods, or the excessive lowering and raising of wages, with an eye 
to private profit, trequently bring about economic depressions 
with disastrous consequence. to individuals and nations.18 Thus 
for the more harmonious attainment ot its own end, as well as 
those spiritual ends to which it is ordained as a means, the eco-
nomic and social organism must secure "for all and eaoh those 
goods which the wealth and resources ot nature, technical achieve-
ment, and the social organization of economic atfairs can give. ul9 
With adequate distribution of material goods, and widespread em-
ployment, men w111 be uplifted "to that higher level of prosper1ty 
and culture which, provided 1t be used with prudence, 1s not only 
no h1ndrance, but 1s ot singular help to virtue," and we might 
add, to the proper fUnctloning of the economlc order itaelt.20 
One other point in which Pius expands on Leo XIII'. doctrine 
i. in the matter ot superfluous wealth. Where Leo advocated giv-
ing superfluous wealth to the indigent as alma, Pius claimed that 
18 Ibld" seots. 14-15, p. 421. See also Economics ~ Socie. Bt. p. 153J Bruehl, pp. 98-99, 112-114. 
19Quadraseslmo ~, sect. 15. p. 421. 
20 Ibid, See also Bruehl, p. 112: "To maintain the right bal-
ance between production and consumption and to enable consumption 
to keep pace with production, it is essential that the various 
tactors entering into the creation of wealth acquire by their pro-
ductive activities and services claims to ehare In the ultimate 
produot to such an extent that the created wealth will really be 
consumed. If this ls accompllaned, the economic process wl11 ac-
tually be self-perpetuating. Soclal wealth, in other worda, must 
be self.distributory." 
r 
the particular needs or contemporary industrial sooiety urged 
rather the investment ot superrluous inoome in job-producing in-
dustries and oooupationa, "provided the labor employed produces 
results whioh are really useful."Zl Charles Bruehl notes the ad-
vantages or uliberality," as Pius oonoeived it, over Leonine 
tt alm.gi vIng" thus, r'Ualng property insociall,. beneficial ways is 
no longer that of a charitable distribution ot superfluous income, 
but rather that of a soc1ally helpful business investment. The 
1deal modern propert1-owner opens up to his rellow men opportuni-
t1.s of emplo,yment by meana ot whioh they acquire the neoessaries 
ot lite, and eventually became propert,T-holdera in their own 
right. • • • AlmaS! v1ng 1s ot second8.1'7 consideration in oU%" eco ... 
nomic system; and should be restrioted to such casea where an in-
d1v1dual 11 unable to perform eoonomically prof1table .ark.a22 
Prom a propertf v1ewpo1nt, therefore, an individual 1. justified 
in the po ••• ss10n ot enormous wealth provided he uses it tor so-
cia1l1 benetic1al purpose., and not private advantage alone. 23 
21guadragea1t!o Anno, secta. $0-51, pp. 414-415. 
22Bruehl, p. 79. 
23Becauae of the unequal talents and moral qualities ot men, 
1 t ia undoubtedly true that the oOlllmon good ot the communIty is 
orten b.tte~ served by 80me large individual property holdings In 
the handa ot experienced entrepreneurs who can make them produoe 
in abundance so01al17 useful goods than by an egalitarIan distri-
bution ot property among a host ot inept or shittless-amall own-
ers. -S.e also~ Ti1.010fRae, 111.-11"8, q. 66, art. 2 Ct Opera 
Omnia, IIIi pp.2q:7":2ij:tf on e value of leg1t1mate self-1nterest 
1n soc1ety_ 
r 
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2. Explanations of Locke'. Pailure 
Locke_ as we noted above, aaw in operation around him an in-
creasingly complex economic system, far removed from the primitive 
condItions described tor the state of nature. Why then did he not 
evolve a set of property rights and duties for contemporary civil 
society as he had done for the state of nature? Or, it time and 
space did not permit such an enlargement of his discussion of pro-
perty, why did he not at least set forth certain principles of so-
cial obligation tram which another could later work out the re-
quired regulat1ons. In the following pages, various opinions will 
be g1ven why Locke did not undertake this obvious task. 
First of all, various historioal arguments are proposed. The 
first presupposes that Lockets a1m in the First Treatise was to 
dismiss hereditary monarchy posaeasing absolute power_ and in the 
S!pond Treatise to vindIcate constitutional government based on 
the consent of the people.24 Thus certain 11nea of thought were 
shut off by the nat~e of the polemic whiCh he was writing. One 
would be the obligat1ons of property-ownership, over and above 
commutative Justice, since the question of state regulation of 
property tor the common good would easily arise.25 As we noted 
24This supposition i8 well established. See oh. I1_ PP. 18-
19; oh. III, pp. 52-53. See also Cook, p. xiii. 
25Jamea Collins. A Histor! ot Modern European Philosophy 
(Milwaukee, 1954). p. 359: fi£B is-polemical aim [Lockeis] requires 
him to lay stress upon the independence and equality of men ••• n 
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above. ppoper-t)y was an explosiv~ isaue 1n Lookean England pas-tll' 
beeaus. of wid.spread grlavane .. aga1nat the CPOWn In Pl'opel'~ 
..... ur ... 26 Looke.,. bay. dee1ll84 It .,r-o advlsable to postpone 
tn. lasue of P1'ope1''1 ob118ati~, eapeolally .a matter tor olVil 
regulation, tor a moPe opportune 000&8100. 
A s.ooo4 hiatorloal apgument .USS .... ~.t Looke was not tut-
17 awan of 'he nee4 tor princlpl •• of 80clal obligation 1n PPO-
pe.'7 _tt... GJIan.t" that dur1ng bi. own lltetlme, econOlld.o 
e'ODCll tiona In Bbgland .ape und4Wgolng np14 vanaformatlon, e.I_, 
ibe .t •• of corporatlona, Inore ••• d tPad ••• pec!ally with the H •• 
World. and paptlo\llul,.. the n.. impOl'tanoa ot mone,.-len41118 or 
tlnano. tn 0_1'08 (u,d 1nduat l'1.27 Y.t Lock. -1 have .1 •• ed the 
algn1t1oanc. of th ••• obangea, •• peclally the tact that .one7 now, 
'Un than land. mun' enoNO\l8 powoP. OtheN1 •• ,.a Gough 0011-
f1Ienu. he nev .... aulA have entrtUate4 cont.rol ot the govePD1l8ftt to 
a prope .. t7-own1ag e11lOl"l.,., and up" ted the. to exeroi.. 1 t I •• 
pap'lall,. In the In' •••• t~ of &11.28 Ooush alao note. that 
Looke' •• "ltu4e towa~ mone,. and tine •• onamia ra.to~ in pollt1cal 
8001 • .,. ... e _ .. OIl ..... hI. con...,. .... 1 •• and. per.taNd ln lIng-
26S•• oh. I. PP. 8·9. 
II.' 21 •• e wk1a. pp. )6-38. S •• alao, oh. III, pp. 6.$-66, nne ~2-4S. 
2800., P. 84. OD the other hand ... e Doha ... 11.- LoGke·. 
~1a. In ravop ot a legislatIve .. Jarl~ .a a p~ •• em1nent17 w.a • 
• Ional" b047 01 men. ... ob.. III, PP. $8.S9. 
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land until the ttm. of the Industrial Revolution.29 Again, as 
Charl~1 Sherman point. out, Looke seemed out of contact with tn. 
laboring clalses in England, who.e intere.ts aa a group most re-
qu1~ed an exposition of the social obligationa of .ealth.30 POI' 
example, what good wal Looke's property theorJ to one wlthout ac-
tual pOlsessiona.3l Henoe, conclude. Sherman, not the great mass 
ot town and count17 laborers, but those "whoBe ind1 vidual in! tia-
tive had. secured economic galns.which theY' were unwilling to see 
despotism wrest from them," i.e., the propertied classes, benefit. 
ed chietl,. trOll Locke's theo17.32 
Protessor Collins claims that 1t was Lockets particular ap-
proaoh to philosophy 1Ihich brought about his absence of soc1al 
thinking. !he analytical tendency ot his philosophioal method 
whioh 1n epiBtemology broke up cognition into sensation and re .... 
fleotlon, "reduced 8001al lite to the atomic individuals from 
which 1 t might be supposed. to o~lglnate. "3.3 Thua disconnected, 
29Gough, p. 84. 
;30Charl.s L. Sherman, ftlntroduction to 'lr~t;'!' .2t Civil 
Government and A Letter concernies 'olerat~on:ohnLOcke" tNe. 
tori, 19j7)';P.-Xlv. 
31Ibid., ala,? Larkin, pp. 77-79; Cook, P. xxx. 
32Sherman, p. xiv. 
33Colliru., p. 360. LOcke'. analysis of human cognition is 
found in An Eesf ooncernlmL Human Under.a tandinf' Bk. II (n On . 
Ideas") # ~11s~PhIl. t pp. ~f:! ... ~t6. 'or examp as of his analyti-
cal proce~e,·.ee especially ch. 1~ pp. 2h8-Z53J oh. 3. pp. 25k.· 
2551 ch, 8, pp. 26)-271; ch, 11, pp. 279-Ze)J ch •. 12, pp. 28.3-2B5. 
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the Lockean members of sooiety never coalesced to fo~ a civil 
government with a common good other than the aggregate sum at in-
dividual goods or the interests of the majority.34 Herbert John-
son attributes this lack ot a true common good in Locke's theory 
ot civil society to hls sensism in epistemology. Since his know. 
ledge or a person, philosophically speaking, was only a composite 
ot sense iapresatons, he could not logioally inter to the exist-
ence ot a common human nature on whlch a true soolal end or oivil 
soclety could be establlshed.3S 
Leo Strauss presents perhaps the most challenging interpreta-
tion ot Looke's theory ot property, with special reference to his 
laok ot 80cial consciousness. As noted earlier, Strauss conceives 
Locke as concealing a revolutionary doctrine at property beneath 
the conventional trappings ot the state ot nature, primitive man, 
eto.36 In reality. he i8 the evangelist of a new Gospel of labor, 
in which "industrIoU8 and rational" men will use their acquisitive 
instincts to create a world of plenty for all. Par trom regula-
ting property in the interests of the publio weltare, "[cJivil 80-
ciety merely creates the conditions under which the individuals 
can pursue their productive.acquisitive activity wlthout obstruc-
3400111ns, PP. 311-312. 
3SJohnson. "Some aemarks etc ••• 
368e• oh. I, pp. 7-8, nne 14-16. 
" . , 
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tion."37 A. proof of his interpretation, Strauss notes that the 
right to appropriate is considerably more limited in the state of 
nature than in civil soc1ety.38 This ia so because the stateot 
nature was a condit1on ot penury 1n which wastage of good. while 
others starved was a serious ottense.39 Money was the institution 
which liberated men's acquisitive instincts and set them on the 
road to prosperity in civil society.4o The great end therefore of 
civil soc1ety MUst be the preservation of individual property in 
order that men, unchecked by private theft or c1vil regulation, 
may exploit their love of gain to the fullest and thus create un-
precedented temporal prosperity for 811.41 
In Strausa'a own word., Locke'a property theory should be in-
terpreted as "the clasaic doctrine of tthe spirit ot capital-
1 ••• -"42 Locke, therefore, instead ot miainterpreting the econam-
l7Strauaa, Batural Right ~ Bisto£Z, p. 246. 
38Strauaa here ignore. the regulatory powers ot legislative 
bodies to alter property arrangement.. See~, Ch. 5, a.ct. 45, 
p. 138. 
39Strauaa, p. 239. 
40Ibid., p. 248. 
41Ibid., PP. 244-~5, 247. See a180 Tawney, p. 179. 
42Ibid., p. 246. Tawney's thesis in the latter part ot aeli-
ston and the Rise of Caeitalism ia that the spirit of capitalIsm, 
t e unashamed-noroveof galii," should be connected with the growth 
of Puri tan1s. among the merchant class8. in seventeenth century 
England. (Tawney, Pp. 246.247) Supposing that a connection ex-
Ists between Locke and seventeenth century English Puritanism (a 
point which this thesis w111 not consider), Strauss's interpreta-
tion of the property theory streng~~ens this connection. 
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scene of his day, was rather a genuine prophet ot the new age ot 
laissez-taire oapitalism and its dedioated apologist. Lockets 
doctrines historioally supported individualistic capitalism 1n 
eighteenth century England.43 Yet this does not nGcessarily imply 
that Locke oonsciously planned an apologia of laispoz-faire eco-
nomics. Sabine says of Locke's political theory that it represen-
ted a somewhat inconsistent amalgam of 30cial and political con-
cepts in seventeenth century England.44 Yet it profoundly affec-
ted English constitutional ~~eory for several generations, because 
it so neatly synthesized the various strains of current philoso-
phical opinion.45 In similar fashion, we may conjecture that 
Lockets economio theory was not an esoteric revolutionary doctrine 
of indiVidualistic economics, but all. amalgam of past and present 
theories of property, solected with an eye to contemporary econam-
43see Coll1ns. p. 362: "Desp1te h1s generous conception at 
fproperty' as inoluding tne happiness and liberty ot ind1viduals, 
Locke's dictum that 'government has no other end but ~le preserva-
t10n of property' worked h1stor1cally as a bulwark or 1ndiv1dual-
isticand laissez-fairs polioies." See also Cook, p. xxxv. 
44Sab1nel p. 537. Also Gough, pp. 70-71: "The state of na-
ture and 1 ts whole concomitant apparatua of natural rights and the 
social contract was the re2;ular stock-in-trade of the poll tical 
writers ot his age." 
45col11n8, PP. 355-3S6. Cook and Gough, however, believe 
that Locke's theories d1d not influence constitutional thoueBt so 
much aa substantiate or legalize actual histor1cal institutions 
already operatinr: within the Brit1sh constitution, e.g., majority--
rule. See Cook, P. xxxii; Gough, PP. 70-71. N.B.: Under either 
1nterpretation, however, Locke oannot be conceived of as a revolu-
tionary. 
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10 and political oonditions in England.46 When tirst published, 
his theory won ready aooeptance with the propertIed classes; yet 
1n the following century it became the "bible" of early English 
loclalists.47 This tact alone may Indicate its eclectic character 
as a treatise on property. 
3. Consequences ot Locke'. FaIlure 
Comparison ot Locke with Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI on 
p.lnciple. ot property ownership demonstrated that no serious 
treatment ot civil property can omit consideration at the 1001al 
nature ot propert)" wIthout great potential harm to the commmi ty 
.. w.l1 aa to Individuals.48 Yet tor one or more ot the reasons 
g1ven In the aeotion immediately preceding, Locke omitted an ade-
quate oonlideration ot property as a 100ial institution. Granted 
that In Lockean civ11 socletr the legislature has the power to al-
ter existing property arrangements tor the common good, ditficul-
t1 •• oonneot.d with a un1~or,m interpretation ot the law of nature 
4Esi~ Wil11am PettT. in hi. freati!t,0t Taxea (1662), stated 
01ear11 the labor-value theopY ot proper:- See I.A. J. Johnson, 
~e~0,s'08,2t MY! ~ (New York. 1937), p. 243. See also . 
ou, P.. n.-2-;-- ~not.8 that in the labor theory of appro-
priation Locke took doctrines already established and joined them 
together: the doctrine ot property as a natural adjunct ot person-
ality, and otproperty as justified by the labor of its creation 
or production. See Cook, p. xxvi. Alao ch. II, p. 40. 
471ax Beer~ ! Hlatorz gt British 80c1a11am (London, 1919), 
I, 101. 
48See pp. 79-84. 
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and wIth the institution of majority-rule in civil assemblies eas-
ily impede the passage or true social legislation in property mat-
ters.49 Furthermore, Locke lert no norma for the determination ot 
a true common good over and above the needs ot particular individ-
uals.SO 
Bequeathing therefore to his tollowers what was virtually an 
absolute right of private property, Looke seriously damaged the 
entire rational basis ot the right. As Walter Lippmann points out 
in his work, ~ PublIc PhilosoE~' property rights without cor-
responding property duties eventually destroy the ratIonale ot 
private property.Sl Lippmann'. own theory ot property indirectly 
.erves as an example ot this process. Lamenting the inequalltiea 
wblch the abuse of Ind1vldual property rights etfected in modern 
civ11 soolety, Lippmann seeks to re~estab11ah property rIghts on 
"the grand ends of civ11 sooiety," contemplated by the noted Eng-
11ah jurist, Wil11am Blaokstone, in the eighteenth century.S2 In 
49~, ch. 11, pp. 183-190; esp. sect. 134. pp. 183-184. 
SOSee PP. 87-88 tor explanations by James Collins and Herbert 
Johnson tor this notable deficiency in Lockets political theory. 
SlWalter Lippmann, The Publ~c Philosophr (Boston, 1955), 
P. 121. 
S2LiPpmann, p. 120. He is quoting Sir william Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws ot England, Bk. II, ch. 1: n ••• the 
legislature ot England has universally promoted the grand ends ot 
civil society, the peace and security of individuals, by steadily 
pursuIng that wise and orderly maxim by assiSBing to everyth1ng 
capable ot ownership a legal and determinate owner." (Ibid •• 
p. 119) 
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this way the natural right of property and its free exercise are 
shifted trom the avaricious individual to the community, anxious 
only for the common good. Yet, however flagrant the abuses of in-
dividual property ownership and however grand the ends of civil 
SOCiety, the immediate result of this transter ot rights is pOli-
tivism. Aa Lippmann b1maelt declares, "The rights ot property •• 
are a creation ot the la.". of the state. And since the la.". can 
be altered, there are no ablolute rIghts of property. There are 
legal rIght. to use and to enloy and to dIspose ot property."S3 
Furthermore, though Lippmann might deny that his theory ot 
property leads to colleotivism, or governmental ownership and con-
trol of property, hi. own words that the ultimate title to proper-
ty is vested in "mankInd, the People, as a corporate community," 
prove the oPPosite.54 The People as a corporate group can ertec-
tively express their wl11 only through the organ of a duly consti-
tuted government. Then because the natural basis of property as 
an indivIdual right has been already supplanted by- positive law, 
government leaders can ea8ily assert, and make effective by law, 
the right ot the government a8 the ofticial representative of the 
community to own and control property formerly under private own-
ership and control. By legislation collective ownership replace. 
SJIbidt , pp. 118-119. 
S4Ibid., p. 119. Collecti viam: ttA poll tical and economlc 
theor,- of social organization based on collective or governmenta.l 
ownership and democra.tic management of the essential means for the 
production and distribution of goods."--Webst. New Coll., p. 944. 
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private property. 
Thus some form of oollectivism logically follows an uninhib-
i~ed pursuance of rugged individualism. The intermediate step 1n 
which positive law is substituted for natural law as the basis of' 
individual property rights, is taken to remedy the abuses spawned 
by excessive 1ndividualism. To maintain the proper balanoe be-
tween the two extremes, the principles of' Pope Pius XI in Quadra-
gesimQ Anno are ver.y helpful. Pius notes that property ownership 
baa a twotold aspeot: "which is individual or social accordingly 
as it regards individuals or concerns the common good."S5 To em-
phasize one aspect too much is to encourage either Individualism 
or Collectivism. Furthermore, both Pius XI and Leo XIII (in~­
rum Novarym) distingu1sh between the right of property and its 
proper Use. The property right must be held by private indiv1du-
als, but should be used in such a way as to promote the common 
good along Wi~l the good of the individual.56 
Pinally, though the property right must be founded in the 
natural law to safeguard its natural basis in the individual, yet 
principles of pos1t1ve law are also needed to determine a workable 
system of' property rIghts and dutIes in c1vil sooiety. The ambi-
gu1ty of' natural law principles of' property in particular oiroum-
stanoes and the need for a positive check to the unprincipled 
55g.uadr&ges1mo!m!2., seet. 45, p. lt12. 
56Ib1d., sects. 47-48, p. 413J also Rerum Novarum, sect. 19, 
~P. 375-376; also pp. 19~O of this chapter. 
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greed of individuals demand the oreation of a system of positive 
law to supplement natural law. In addition, positive property 
legislation is required to establish t~e condi tions rlecessary for 
a true co17n'11on good, e.g., the erection of schoolo, hospitals. 
roads through taxation, ap~ropriation, etc. fllUS property as a 
total institution in modern society is a complex of mutually in-
terdependent positivo qnd natural law.57 
r.n summary, then, conce!"ning TJocke r s intentions as a poll ti-
cal a.nd economio theorist, Professor Sabine's encomium of the man 
expresses our own opinion also: "His sincerity, his profound moral 
conviction, his genuine belief in liberty, in human rights. and in 
the dignity of human nature, united with his moderation and good 
sense, made him the ideal spokesman of a middle-class revolu-
tion."58 His theory of property exhibits certain glaring defi-
oienoies, as we have noted in the preceding pages. The subordina-
tion of the property theory to the aims of the entire Treatise £a 
Civil Government certainly accounts for some of these errors. Yet 
with its defects Locke's property theory had a profolmd effect on 
1<.ngliah economic and poli tica.l development in the ei["pteenth cen-
tury.59 EVen today commentators acknowledge t..'1.a.t John Locke, 
faulty logic H.nd oversimplified explanations notwithstanding, 
57See Quadragesimo ~, sect. 49, pp. 413-414; also Rerum 
Novarum, sect. " p. 309; and p. 79 of this chapter. 
58sablne, p. 540. 
59Gough, p .. 91. See also 00. I, pp. 11-13. 
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reached many of the right oonolusions in the very important and 
involved field of property rights and duties. 
r 
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